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COPYRIGHT DEPGSffi 



THE BATTLE OF BOOBY'S BLUFFS 



i/ The Battle 

of 
Booby's BlufFs 

B, 

Major Single List / 



Reprinted from the 

INFANTRY JOURNAL 
1921 



Washington: 

United States Infantry Association 

1922 






Copyright 1921 and 1922 
United States Infantry Association * 



JAN 27 13^2 



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©CIA654530 ^ 



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PREFACE 

THIS IS a series of six solutions 
to the same problem, each solu- 
tion starting with the lessons 
learned by the errors in the previous so- 
lution. The six solutions are designed 
to teach the application of the princi- 
ples as developed in the World War, 
showing the best methods of using the 
combined arms. Naturally, it is impos- 
sible to include every principle in these 
six solutions, but it is thought that the 
most important are shown. 

It will be noticed that each solution 
portrays the actions of a certain type 
of regimental commander. 

The reader will at once see that the 
general plan of these six solutions is 
the same as in "The Defense of Duffer's 
Drift," a story of the troubles of a 
platoon commander in defending a 
stream crossing during the British-Boer 
War. 



PROLOGUE 

THE BLUES (east) and Reds 
(west) were at war. This was 
nothing new. The Blues and the 
Reds are always at war. They have 
been at war since the beginning of 
wars. It is said that in the time of 
Augustus Caesar the Temple of Janus 
closed its doors because the Romans 
were no longer at war; but this can- 
not apply to the Blues and Reds. They 
are still at war and, in my opinion, 
they will always be at war. The Reds 
seem to have remarkable recuperative 
powers, because although they are invar- 
iably defeated by General A, commander 
of the Blues and the most remarkable 
military genius of all time, yet we al- 
ways find them ready to tackle General 
A again at the first opportunity. Some- 
times they are assisted and sometimes 
opposed by the Browns, a neutral nation, 
but generally they are alone in their 
unsuccessful efforts to hamper General 
A. Truly, one cannot help admiring 
the morale of these poor Reds; always 
they are defeated, always they come for- 
ward again. Defeat never lessens their 
morale. They hope that they will win 
out next time. Possibly, they have 
hopes that a stray bullet may kill Gen- 
eral A, or possibly they are righting with 
the courage of despair and want to end 
5 



6 Booby's Bluffs 

it all. At any rate, they are always 
ready for the next fight. 

However, this time it was real war, 
and I, Major Single List, was in actual 
command of the First Battalion of 
Colonel R's Regiment, which had just 
relieved another regiment on the line 
and was now going into battle for the 
first time. For years, I had heard of the 
campaigns of General A, and had hoped 
that if I ever was lucky enough or un- 
lucky enough to go into battle I would 
have him as commander. And now it 
had happened. We, the Blues, had 
driven the Reds steadily westward until 
they were holding a line along the Mono- 
cacy River to somewhere near the mouth 
of Booby's Creek, thence northward 
along the general line of Booby's Creek. 
Their line was not clearly defined, but 
we knew that they were making a last 
stand to hold General A east of the 
passes of South Mountain, so that when 
their expected reinforcements material- 
ized they could advance safely through 
these passes and deploy in the open 
country to the eastward. Naturally, 
General A had decided that this must be 
prevented. We were to make a final at- 
tack and drive the Reds back into South 
Mountain, capture and destroy as many 
of them as possible, and block the exits 
of the passes. 

By daybreak of this day, June 19, our 



Prologue 7 

regiment had finished relieving the other 
regiment, and my battalion was now in a 
fairly concealed position somewhat east 
of the road running north and south 
about on coordinate 345. My battalion 
command post was established in the 
cellar of the farmhouse at 345.8-729.4. 
I visited my companies in position, 
found everything O. K., then returned 
to my command post and tried to sleep. 
I was not very successful. This was 
my first battle, and I was somewhat ex- 
cited over the prospect. My troops were 
likewise somewhat excited, as shown by 
the fact that many useless inquiries were 
made of me ; so many in fact that I was 
unable to sleep before noon. After noon 
I managed to sleep a little, but was 
wakened about 3 o'clock by an orderly 
from Colonel R with orders and maps, 
and with a message directing me to re- 
port to regimental headquarters at 6 
o'clock for a conference of the regimen- 
tal field and staff officers. 

Immediately I looked at the maps and 
orders received, and saw that they were 
the plans for an attack the next day. Evi- 
dently we were to report to Colonel R's 
headquarters for a conference on the 
subject. A glance at the orders showed 
that Colonel R had decided to make the 
assault in column of battalions, and that 
mine was to be the leading battalion. 
We were to attack due west, the north- 



8 Booby's Bluffs 

ern boundary being coordinate 730 and 
the southern boundary coordinate 729, 
making my area a strip 1,000 yards wide 
and of such depth as I could force the 
Reds to give up. The attack was to com- 
mence at sunrise June 20 (4.30 o'clock) . 
The orders and plans were plain 
enough, but I did not know just what 
to do about them. I gazed at the map 
and orders until my eyes were weary and 
the whole thing became a blur. I was 
very tired, the weather was hot, and I 
was very sleepy. So, to make a long 
story short, I went to sleep. In thus 
going to sleep I had three reasons: 
First, I was sleepy and needed the 
sleep; second, I was to report to Colo- 
nel R at 6 o'clock and he would explain 
the whole scheme of attack to us, and I 
wanted to be fresh and clear-headed 
when I was at his headquarters; third, 
I wanted to give my subconscious mind 
a chance to work out the solution to my 
real war problem. Many times I have 
found it best to let my body rest and 
my subconscious mind work. Others 
have told me that they also find that their 
subconscious minds can work out prob- 
lems which they cannot work out in 
moments of real wakefulness. So I 
went to sleep and my subconscious mind 
evolved a series of solutions, each of 
which impressed me at the beginning as 
entirely satisfactory ; but events showed 



Prologue 9 

that, although I learned something by 
each solution, yet all of the solutions 
were not by any means such as would 
have been approved by General A. 

Each is given just as it was evolved 
by my subconscious mind. The reader 
will notice that each solution was begun 
with the utmost confidence in its ulti- 
mate effectiveness. That is one thing 
about my subconscious mind, it is al- 
ways satisfied with what it has evolved 
until it comes to grief, then with re- 
markable alacrity it evolves something 
else. At any rate I slept, and my sub- 
conscious mind evolved many consecu- 
tive solutions. 



FIRST SOLUTION 

AT 6 o'clock I attended the confer- 
ence of field and staff officers at 
u Colonel R's headquarters. He 
read over the order to us, and explained 
it in full. I was a little impatient, be- 
cause it appeared as if Colonel R 
thought we could not read or at least 
could not understand a field order. 
Several times he asked me if I under- 
stood my part. I always replied in 
the affirmative. Once or twice he 
asked me if I was sure that I under- 
stood; but I would not allow him to 
get me into a controversy. I had long 
ago decided that I would avoid any argu- 
ments with him. He seemed of a cruel 
nature and a jealous disposition. He 
did not understand how to handle the 
American soldier ; and it appeared to me 
that he was jealous of me because I was 
so successful at it. 

I always tried to get close to the 
soldier and understand his methods of 
thought. Every one of my men knew 
I was ready to lend him a helping hand, 
and even money. This generous care of 
my fellow-soldiers had often been a 
cause of dispute with Colonel R. 

Our colonel was a good soldier, but 
he had lost the milk of human kindness. 
On one occasion I had a great argument 
with him because I had not reported 
two boys who had indulged in a shooting 

11 



12 Booby's Bluffs 

scrape in one of the company streets. 
To me it was simply an overbubbling of 
youthful spirits, but to Colonel R it was 
a crime. It is true that one of the 
boys had been shot in the arm and had 
been in the hospital for two weeks, but 
that was a mere trifle. 

On another occasion Colonel R had 
spoken to me in a very tactless manner 
because I had allowed three of the boys 
to leave camp and visit the city the 
night before a maneuver. They stayed 
out until 4 o'clock, and naturally were 
unable to go through the strenuous work 
of the next day. 

As I remember his words, he said: 
"Major List, you have no discipline in 
your battalion. I am not sure that I 
should not relieve you and send you to 
Bluey for reclassification. You think 
that you are thoughful of your men, 
whereas if you persist in your course 
you will cause the loss of many lives in 
battle. It is a serious error to think that 
even the best men can be good soldiers 
without a rigid course of training. It 
is a mistaken kindness to mollycoddle 
soldiers. You will have men who are in- 
efficient and who will be unable to at- 
tend to their duties in the stress of bat- 
tle. You must understand that bravery 
is by no means the only quality de- 
manded of an officer. I can find many 
officers who will lead troops in battle, 



First Solution 13 

but I can find few men who can see that 
they are properly fed and furnished am- 
munition and taught to shoot. The days 
of spectacular charges and gallant deaths 
are past. Nowadays, you are shot by 
men you do not see ; and the worst pos- 
sible thing for a major to do is to step 
out in front of his troops and expose 
himself to an unnecessary death. You 
should be in front only when they are 
being misled. You should never go in 
front of them in order to show your per- 
sonal bravery. I do not doubt your per- 
sonal bravery, but I seriously doubt your 
personal efficiency." 

I did not say much in reply. He had 
just discovered that the score of my 
battalion on the target range was the 
poorest of the three battalions; and I 
could not deny it. But there were rea- 
sons for this poor showing. The noble 
citizens of the neighboring city had given 
a festival in honor of the troops soon 
to go overseas, and this festival had 
come just on the day that my battalion 
shot for record. It had been necessary 
for us to hasten our target practice in 
the morning so that the boys could be 
free to go to the city in the afternoon 
and evening. 

I did not take the trouble to explain 
all of this to Colonel R. He would not 
have understood because he has no heart 
for his fellow-man. Also I felt sure 



14 Booby's Bluffs 

that he was jealous of my undoubted 
popularity with the boys. I think that 
he feared that if the matter were put 
to a vote among them, I would be 
Colonel List and he would be Major R 
or Captain R or even Private R. How- 
ever, I felt that the United States au- 
thorities should know what manner of 
man was commanding the regiment. So 
I wrote a letter to my personal friend, 
Senator Sorghum, and told him that I 
felt sure that the regiment had lost its 
heart through the relentless grinding of 
Colonel R, and that if it did not make a 
good showing against the Reds in the 
coming campaign he would know where 
to place the blame. There was no real 
insubordination in this letter and no one 
could criticise my motive. I felt that my 
duty to my country demanded that when 
the regiment failed in battle he should 
go to the Secretary of War and give him 
the reason for the failure. I was very 
careful to tell the Senator not to men- 
tion my name. 

In justice to myself I must add that 
I also told the Senator not to make any 
effort to secure promotion for me; that 
I expected to win my promotion on the 
field of battle ; and that I felt sure that 
my record in future battles would bring 
to me all the promotion that I could 
desire. 



First Solution 15 

Finally Colonel R finished the plans 
for the attack, after reading the field 
order several times, and we all went 
back to our posts. I returned to my 
battalion headquarters (the farmhouse 
cellar) and promptly went to sleep. I 
was tired and needed complete rest be- 
fore the strenuous day of battle. I was 
soon sleeping as peacefully as Napoleon 
before Austerlitz. 

At 3.30 o'clock my adjutant Lieuten- 
ant Swift waked me. He apologized 
for waking me, but said that he knew 
that the attack was to take place at 4.30 
o'clock, and he supposed that I wished 
to go out and look over the ground be- 
fore the attack commenced. He stated 
that he had been reading the orders and 
noticed that the barrage started at 4.30 
o'clock from the north and south road 
about 800 yards west of my cellar, and 
he had notified the company commanders 
that they could expect me to meet them 
at the farmhouse in the center of our 
sector (345.2-729.6) at 4 o'clock. He 
also stated that various officers of tanks, 
machine guns, signal troops, and light 
mortars had reported during the night; 
but that he had told them to go to sleep 
in the next room (where the farmer 
kept his potatoes) and that I would 
wake them up at the proper time. 

I was much displeased at the action of 
Lieutenant Swift in making arrange- 



16 Booby's Bluffs 

ments for me to meet the captains at 4 
o'clock. I had not slept as much as 
usual, and for the moment I was in a bad 
humor. Also this Lieutenant Swift was 
quite prone to usurp my powers as bat- 
talion commander. He was always tak- 
ing it upon himself to give orders dur- 
ing my absence. I had told him time 
after time that I was commander of this 
battalion and that I would give all of the 
orders necessary. However, I was quite 
elated this morning at the prospect of a 
battle in which I would earn undying 
glory and have my name written on the 
pages of history alongside our famous 
soldiers, so I did not talk very severely 
to Lieutenant Swift. I only told him 
that I must again remind him that I was 
the commander of this battalion, and 
that he would in future make no ap- 
pointments for me and give no orders 
in my name. 

Incidentally, to soften my reprimand, 
I told him that he had done well to dis- 
pose of the various officers of tanks, 
machine guns, signal troops, etc., so 
smoothly, and that we would let them 
sleep, poor fellows. Probably they were 
as tired as we were. I never had the 
heart to make a fellow being do more 
work than was absolutely necessary. 
Of course, the poor infantryman must 
get up early and take the Red position ; 
but that was no reason why the officers 



First Solution 17 

of other services should not rest at every 
opportunity. 

After I had disposed of Lieutenant 
Swift with a half reprimand, I found 
it necessary to frown also upon the 
freshness of my intelligence officer, 
Lieutenant Bright. He told me that 
he had been studying the map, and that 
he had talked with the officers of the 
regiment we relieved. As a result, he 
believed that the Reds were all on the 
other side of Booby's Creek, and were 
in force in the woods on the south side 
of the east and west section of the 
creek for 1,000 yards east of Hill 
443. This was too much. I had for- 
given Lieutenant Swift because he had 
disposed of the various officers of tanks, 
machine guns, signal troops, etc., but this 
suggestion of Lieutenant Bright was 
more than I could stand. It was not the 
first time that he had seemed to think 
that it was his duty to come forward and 
volunteer queer bits of information that 
he had gathered. At any rate, I did not 
waste time with him. I just told him 
that if I wanted to hear from him, I 
would call on him. Meanwhile he need 
not volunteer any information. 

Thus you can see that I went out on 
the field in a fairly bad humor for a man 
who was to participate in his first battle. 
However, I summoned a smile as soon 
as I reached the vicinity of my brave 



18 Booby's Bluffs 

boys, for it would never do for them to 
see that I was out of humor. How often 
have I heard my father read of the 
cheery smiles that made J. E. B. Stuart 
and McClellan popular. Their soldiers 
were always glad to see them, and 
cheered them whenever they rode down 
the line. In this case I did not feel 
that I could justly expect a cheer. I 
was not mounted on a horse and the sun 
was not shining gloriously; in fact, the 
dawn was just beginning to break. How- 
ever, I felt that it would not surprise me 
greatly if some of the boys should give 
a huzza when they saw their major com- 
ing to lead them on to battle and victory. 
There were no cheers on my approach, 
and I decided that the nearness of the 
enemy prevented any such greetings. 
However, my reception was quite cor- 
dial. The four captains crowded around 
me to receive their orders. I did not 
waste time, but gave them as briefly as 
possible. I said: "You know all the 
drill regulations. We have been over 
this many times on the drill field. B 
and C companies form the firing line ; A 
and D companies form the support. 
Lieutenant Swift, you will form the bat- 
talion just east of this ridge in the center 
of our sector, facing west. They will 
be ready at 4.25 o'clock, as the attack 
starts exactly at 4.30." The captains 



First Solution 19 

and the adjutant saluted and each cap- 
tain moved off to join his company. 

For the next half hour I walked up 
and down the ridge, or just east of it, 
where the whole battalion could see me 
and be encouraged by my coolness in 
the face of danger. I felt that each one 
should know that I was there to go for- 
ward with him to victory or death. 

I walked along the front of the com- 
panies and joked with many of my per- 
sonal friends. I remember especially 
that one excellent sergeant of B Com- 
pany hailed me with a glad shout of 
"Hello, Single ! How do you feel in the 
face of the real thing?" and I replied 
with some cheerful remark to the effect 
that I was going home with my shield 
or upon it. 

I then remembered the young son of 
one of my best friends, a Mr. Hale, vice- 
president of the bank in my home town 
before I entered the military game, so 
I hunted him up and talked with him. 
He was very glad to see me, and en- 
trusted me with many loving messages 
to his friends, and I will also say to 
his fiancee. He said : "Major, I know 
you will be with us in any danger, but 
I have a feeling that you will live 
through the battle, and I do not think 
that I shall do so. For the sake of your 
friendship for my father and for my 
family I want you to tell them all that 



20 Booby's Bluffs 

I died with my face to the enemy and 
with their names on my lips." I wrung 
his hand and promised to tell them that 
and much more in case any misfortune 
befell him. I had known him since he 
was a small boy, and I sincerely hoped 
that nothing would happen to him. We 
were still conversing when Lieutenant 
Swift came up to tell me that the bat- 
talion was ready to form. It was 4.22, 
so I wished young Frank Hale "God- 
speed" and left him. 

As I was walking with Lieutenant 
Swift over to the center of the line I 
had occasion to feel thankful that I had 
been so careful in the training of my 
battalion. In the last Infantry Drill 
Regulations some young upstart had 
written a statement to the effect that, in 
extended order, the company is the 
largest unit to execute movements by 
prescribed commands. But when I be- 
came battalion commander I did not feel 
at all disposed to relinquish my direct 
command of my companies, so I had 
trained my companies to execute the 
movements of extended order by bat- 
talion, with the same commands as in 
the former drill regulations. Thus I was 
sure that the attack would come off in 
the best possible manner. My boys were 
trained to the minute, eager and willing 
to fall upon the Reds. 

At 4.25 o'clock Lieutenant Swift 



First Solution 21 

called the battalion to attention, faced 
about and reported, "Sir, the battalion is 
formed. " I told him to take his post, 
and commanded, "Rest," as I wished the 
companies to rest even to the last minute 
before going forward for the struggle 
which might last all day. I looked at 
my watch and marked the second hand 
as it slowly counted off the seconds un- 
til 4.30. The eyes of all of my soldiers 
were on me, and I felt that no one could 
criticise me for lack of coolness and 
courage. I calmly stood there, making 
a few commonplace remarks to Lieu- 
tenants Swift and Bright, who seemed 
anxious to suggest something, but they 
had learned that I was the commander 
of this battalion, so they kept quiet. At 
4.29 I faced about, and everyone could 
see from my stern attitude that the time 
had arrived. I then watched the second 
hand, which was spelling time for us and 
eternity for thousands of Reds and for 
some of us. 

Just at 4.30 I lowered my left hand 
(which carried my wrist watch) and 
started to command, "Form for attack." 
The most infernal racket burst forth. 
Shells by the thousand burst on the 
north and south road just west of me, 
and my command could not be heard 
more than ten feet. 

I was dumfounded. Such a racket 
had never been heard in any boiler-shop 



22 Booby's Bluffs 

or iron-foundry that I had ever visited. 
I could not think what had happened. 
How had the enemy known that we were 
to attack at this moment? I began to 
suspect treachery ; but I knew that there 
could be no treachery in my battalion. 
Possibly some Red spies had slipped over 
in the early dawn and had heard Lieu- 
tenant Swift's statement that the attack 
began at 4.30 At any rate we were 
lucky in that the Reds did not have our 
range, and as long as we remained where 
we were there need be no casualties. 

I waited a few seconds, and was a lit- 
tle amused at the facial expressions of 
Lieutenants Swift and Bright. Being 
young men, they naturally were a little 
more prone to surprise than I was. I 
smiled to reassure them, and said, "It 
is all right, my boys ; the enemy has not 
our range, and we seem to be perfectly 
safe. In fact it is evident that they are 
aiming less and less accurately ; the shots 
seem to be falling shorter and farther 
from us." 

Then Lieutenant Swift yelled in a 
most disrespectful manner: "The bar- 
rage ! It's our barrage, and it travels at 
the rate of 100 yards in four minutes. 
Of course, it is missing us more and 
more. We must catch it. If we don't 
take advantage of it our artillery will be 
of no assistance to us." 

At once it came back to me. Colonel 



First Solution 23 

R had said in the conference of his field 
and staff officers that the barrage would 
start at 4.30 o'clock and move forward 
at once. Immediately I rose to the oc- 
casion. My voice could not be heard, so 
I opened my mouth several times and 
waved my hand. It made my heart 
bound to see how quickly the intelligent 
American soldier can adapt himself to 
circumstances. The majority of my 
men were volunteers and they under- 
stood at once what was wanted. Prompt- 
ly B and C companies moved out in ex- 
tended order, and A and D companies 
prepared to follow. At a double time B 
and C companies spread over the center 
of our sector, guiding center, one man 
per yard. This covered about 500 yards, 
leaving some 250 yards on either flank, 
which was to be covered by A and D 
companies as they advanced later at the 
prescribed distance of about 300 yards. 

I took my position about 150 yards 
behind the center of the front line. The 
whole battalion moved forward in per- 
fect order, guiding center, the front 
line some sixty yards behind our bar- 
rage. 

My heart swelled with pride. Every- 
thing was working smoothly. It is true 
that some of the boys were falling, and 
my heart bled in sympathy ; but I gritted 
my teeth like a soldier, and marched 
proudly forward, calm and collected. 



24 Booby's Bluffs 

When we reached the crest, some four 
minutes after our advance had started, 
I halted for a moment and gazed upon 
the scene with my field glasses. The 
morning sun showed a perfect picture. 
One hundred and fifty yards ahead of 
me were B and C companies in a mag- 
nificent line, marching straight to the 
front as if on parade. Some sixty yards 
in front of them was our barrage, still 
going forward at the rate of 100 yards 
in four minutes. Behind me, 150 yards, 
and off to the right and left flanks, re- 
spectively, were the A and D companies, 
now in platoon columns. I felt that my 
weary days of work in the training camp 
were producing their reward. With a 
smile I placed my field glasses in the 
case and hurried forward to regain my 
position back of the center, midway be- 
tween the two lines. 

I heard Lieutenant Bright say to 
Lieutenant Swift, "Look at the shells 
bursting just this side of the creek. 
Either we have an extra wide barrage or 
it is their protective barrage in front of 
their line. My best information says 
that their line is west of the creek. If 
that is their protective barrage they will 
switch it as soon as they locate us, and 
then we will have an awful time." I saw 
nothing to justify Lieutenant Bright in 
this dismal prediction. I did not care 



First Solution 25 

to administer any further admonitions 
to him, so I calmly marched forward. 

After about twenty minutes the left 
of my front line arrived opposite the 
trees, already mentioned, on the south 
side of the bend in Booby's Creek at 
344.4-729.3, the barrage having passed 
this point. I saw a few men break from 
the left and start for the creek only 
some forty yards away, but a sharp com- 
mand from a lieutenant or a sergeant 
called them back into line and they con- 
tinued forward. 

Evidently some of the Reds were in 
that creek bottom, but the platoon com- 
mander knew that I would send up some 
men from the support to clear them out. 
It was his duty to march straight ahead 
just as I had taught them day after day 
on the parade ground. I quickly turned 
to the left and waved forward a platoon 
from D Company, pointing to the creek 
bend. Not a second did they hesitate. 
Bravely they started forward, but luck 
was against me. I heard a rat-tat-tat 
from the creek bottom, then a contin- 
uous roll of rat-tat-tats. The left of my 
front line just crumpled up and lay 
down. It vanished. 

The right, true to its training, imme- 
diately began to advance by rushes, 
straight to the front. Probably they had 
seen an enemy or something to their 
front. Steadily and surely they rose, 



26 Booby's Bluffs 

rushed forward and fell, firing to the 
front. Each time fewer rose and rushed 
forward. Always some fell. But re- 
lief was at hand; the platoon from the 
D Company was only some 100 yards 
away. I signalled "double time," and 
they rushed forward and silenced the 
machine gun. 

For a few moments I breathed free- 
ly. But not for long. Suddenly, 100 
yards back of me, there was again an 
unearthly racket, shells exploding and 
iron splinters z-z-z-z-zing in all direc- 
tions. Lieutenant Bright yelled "There 
it is! They have us located!" and 
truly it seemed so. One platoon of D 
Company simply disappeared. Half of 
another was blown into the air. Cap- 
tain D, with rare presence of mind, com- 
manded, "Scatter, boys, SCATTER!" 1 
and the rest of the company abandoned 
all formation and rushed pell-mell for 
the creek bottom. On the right the en- 
emy's counter-barrage seemed less ef- 
fective. Possibly they did not have 
enough guns, and they made it thicker 
on my left. 

I moved over to my right and placed 
myself between the two lines, and we 
continued to move forward. Personally, 
I felt that this showed great fortitude 
on my part. Practically half of my 



X A command actually given in an Amer- 
ican machine gun battalion in France. 



First Solution 27 

battalion had been killed or wounded, 
and yet I had not sounded the retreat. 

At Bull Run the Federal troops re- 
tired with much less loss than that. 
In fact in no one of our great battles 
had the losses been 50 per cent. Yet 
here was I, Major List, still pushing for- 
ward after over 50 per cent of my men 
had been killed or wounded. 

For some four more minutes we fol- 
lowed the barrage without accident. 
Then again we had hard luck. The bar- 
rage passed some more Red machine 
guns concealed in the woods south of 
the bend, and my line began to crumple 
up on the left. Still we struggled for- 
ward, and I noted with pleasure that a 
small party gained the top of Hill 407 
and disappeared. My joy was short- 
lived, for just then the Red counter- 
barrage switched from D Company and 
fell upon A Company. My last supports 
vanished, and no first line existed ex- 
cept a few men on Hill 407. 

My battalion was ruined. We had 
captured Hill 407, but at what a price! 
On all sides my brave boys were wound- 
ed and dying. Time after time my 
name was called, and I stopped to com- 
fort old and personal friends, Finally, 
to my great grief, I came across young 
Frank Hale mortally wounded. I 
stopped and bent over him. "My boy, 
my boy, what can I do?" "Major," he 



28 Booby's Bluffs 

said, "can't you call us anything but 
boys ? Don't you think some of us have 
behaved like grown-up men today?" 
And he smiled and died. 

My cup was full, but it overflowed 
when a messenger rushed up from Cap- 
tain B to say that he had captured Hill 
407, but he had not been issued extra 
ammunition and would have to retire if 
I could not send him some. I had none 
to send him. I did not even know where 
to find it. 

Though overcome with bitterness at 
Colonel R for having given me the 
hardest job of any of the battalions, 
I determined to be a soldier to my dying 
breath. My brave boys were streaming 
back over the field in wild confusion. 
No human flesh could stand against that 
hail of lead from the woods across the 
creek on our left. I sent Lieutenant 
Bright back to Colonel R to ask for 
help — that we were utterly beaten. 
Meanwhile I determined that I would 
sell my life as dearly as possible. No 
one at home should ever say that I, 
Single List, had fled from the foe. We 
had seen no enemy, but it was evident 
that many Red machine guns were in 
the woods south of the creek. I called 
for volunteers, and some forty brave 
lads gathered around me. 

Remembering my grandfather's story 
of how he rallied his men in the deadly 



First Solution 29 

Devil's Den at Gettysburg, I seized a 
gun and began to exhort them to do 
their duty by their fellow-countrymen. 
The tyrannical Reds must not triumph. 
Our freedom was in danger. The coun- 
try's honor was at stake. Remember 
the glorious democracy for which they 
were fighting. I would lead them and 
be one of them. All became fired with 
my enthusiasm. They clamored for im- 
mediate action. They cried, "Lead on, 
List, we're with you!" I turned to 
lead them, but just then three shells 
burst in our group and machine gun 
bullets swept us like a hose. I was un- 
hurt, but when the dust cleared not a 
man of my volunteers was with me — 
all were dead, wounded, or missing. I 
looked around the field, but could see 
no men. All of my battalion had dis- 
appeared. 

Suddenly, Lieutenant Swift grabbed 
my arm and said, "Look !" I looked to 
the rear and saw a thin line of Blue skir- 
mishers coming over the ridge. The 
Second Battalion was coming up, but it 
was too late. My battalion had been 
fighting the whole battle alone, and it 
was demolished. No amount of rein- 
forcements could reestablish the battle 
or bring my brave boys (men) back to 
me. As the line passed by me I saw 
that the major of the Second Battalion 
was in command and that he was ac- 



30 Booby's Bluffs 

companied by the lieutenant colonel. The 
latter spoke to me curtly and said, 
"Colonel R orders that you report to 
him immediately. I shall take command 
of your battalion — what is left of it." 

As I walked back to Colonel R, I was 
very much crestfallen. It was evident 
that I was to be relieved. Well, I was 
willing. My battalion was gone and 
my heart was broken. I cared no more 
for wars, and I wanted a peaceful time 
in the Service of Supply. But I did 
think that Colonel R should at least 
thank me for the gallant work done by 
my battalion. In his dispatches he should 
mention that the First Battalion, under 
Major Single List, had bravely breasted 
the leaden hail and captured Hill 407, 
but was unable to advance farther be- 
cause of its severe losses. 

I did not expect him to mention that 
my battalion had fought the whole bat- 
tle alone and unsupported, and had been 
stopped through lack of support after 
it had captured .the Red fort on Hill 
407, but I did hope that he would ac- 
knowledge that it had been specially se- 
lected for the most difficult task. Also 
I felt that he should specially mention 
my gallantry in rallying forty volunteers 
and advancing to clinch the victory by 
capturing the Red machine gun nest. He 
should have left me with my battalion 
now that the victory was won, and at 



First Solution 31 

night the Second Battalion could have 
safely taken over the position so gal- 
lantly won by us. 

I reported to Colonel R. He told me 
that I was relieved; that he had rec- 
ommended that I be sent back for re- 
classification ; that I was not fit to com- 
mand the battalion, and that I would at 
once go back to division headquarters 
and report to General A. 

I need not give a long discussion here 
of the explanations given by Colonel 
R. It seems that he blamed me for 
not taking the machine guns before they 
enfiladed my line, but gave no idea as 
to how I was to do it. He blamed me 
for letting my men run out of ammu- 
nition, but said nothing about the fact 
that no ammunition carts had reported 
to me. He blamed me for allowing my 
men to be caught in close formation by 
the Reds' counter-barrage, but offered 
no suggestions as to how it could be 
avoided. In short, he blamed me and 
not himself for the loss of the battle. 
He offered no satisfactory explanation 
of why he had made my battalion fight 
the battle alone. He belittled my capture 
of the Red fort on Hill 407 ; said it was 
no victory; that there was not a single 
Red on Hill 407. He made many heart- 
less remarks about the lack of fighting 
qualities in my battalion ; said it was run 
like a political club. This last I did not 



32 Booby's Bluffs 

discuss with him, as I saw that he was 
moved by jealousy, and I said nothing 
more to him. I determined to appeal to 
General A. 

At division headquarters General A 
was too busy to see me, and the adjutant 
handed me an order to go to Bluey for 
reclassification. As no one would give 
me justice, I sat down and wrote to 
my friend, Senator Sorghum, and told 
him all about the battle and my victory 
and about Colonel R's robbing me and 
my brave battalion of the credit. I knew 
that Senator Sorghum would understand 
me and would see that I received justice 
from the War Department in Washing- 
ton. The letter finished, I became calm 
and peaceful, and — woke up. 

At first I was displeased with my 
subconscious mind. It had not at all 
solved my problem. However, I had 
at least learned four things not to do: 

1. Do not let your battalion become 
a political club. 

2. Do not let machine guns enfilade 
your line. 

3. Do not fail to issue extra ammuni- 
tion. Look it up. 

4. Do not get caught in close forma- 
tion by enemy's counter-barrage. 

These lessons were not enough for 
my problem. I slept, and again my sub- 
conscious mind began to revolve and 
evolve. 



SECOND SOLUTION 

AT 6 O'CLOCK I attended the 
conference at Colonel R's head- 
quarters as in First Solution, but 
I knew a few more principles than in 
that solution. For one thing, I felt 
sure that no troops of mine would ever 
become a political club. 

For years, Colonel Grant had been 
my ideal soldier. Like him I refrained 
from useless speech during office hours. 

How well do I remember my first 
regimental commander, Colonel Puff. 
How military, how soldierly, how dig- 
nified on occasions, how punctiliously 
truly a model soldier. Off duty he was 
very pleasant and a true friend, but 
on duty he never forgot himself. Once 
while I was on a scouting expedition, I 
had sent in a requisition for rations and 
had sent also a note of explanation, be- 
ginning, "Dear Colonel." The rations 
did not come, but there did come back 
the whole requisition and a short offi- 
cial letter to the effect that "Lieutenant 
List will omit all terms of endearment 
in future communications. He will re- 
write his communication and resubmit 
the requisition." My party nearly 
starved to death before the rations 
came, but the lesson learned was one 
never to be forgotten. Ah! there was 
the true soldier and gentleman! 

88 



34 Booby's Bluffs 

Colonel R was my senior officer, and, 
as such, entitled to my respect and 
obedience. Even so, with all due re- 
spect, he lacked the military spirit of 
Colonel Puff. At this meeting of his 
field and staff officers, Colonel R spent 
much time discussing the order and 
asking questions, instead of simply giv- 
ing orders in a manner which would 
insure their being obeyed. Two or 
three times he asked me if I understood, 
and I always answered : "Sir, the Colo- 
nel's orders will be carried out as he 
commands." He looked doubtfully at 
me for a few moments, but was evi- 
dently impressed by my soldierly de- 
meanor, and said nothing. In the 
training area he had always found that 
I had carried out his orders absolutely 
to the letter, and, although our train- 
ing had been cut short by the exigencies 
of war, he knew that I would measure 
up to the standard. 

After talking more about this small 
attack than General Grant did about 
the battle of Cold Harbor, Colonel R 
finally dismissed us. We all went back 
to our posts. 

At once I ordered Lieutenant Swift 
(my adjutant) to send for the company 
commanders to report to me for orders. 
Lieutenant Bright had gone away, 
without permission, during my absence, 



Second Solution 35 

but he returned shortly. I asked him 
where the ammunition carts could be 
found, and he replied that they were 
only some 400 yards to the southeast 
at the road fork to this farm house. 
This was very encouraging, and I told 
Lieutenant Bright so, which pleased 
him very much. 

This Lieutenant Bright was a very 
capable youngster, but, like all young- 
sters nowadays, lacked the respect 
which was rendered to seniors in my 
youth. Lieutenant Bright was always 
volunteering information that he had 
gathered, and even now he burst out 
with the statement that he had talked 
with the regiment that we relieved, and 
that he was practically certain that no 
Reds were on our side of Booby's 
Creek. I very quickly told Lieutenant 
Bright that when I wanted to hear from 
him, he would be sent for; meanwhile, 
I could dispense with his remarks. So 
he went out of the cellar. 

Very soon, the four captains reported 
and stood at attention in front of me. 
I gave them their orders quickly. I 
told them that the battalion would be 
formed in the manner prescribed in 
the former drill regulations ; that Com- 
panies B and C would make the attack 
in the manner prescribed, at a distance 
of one man per yard; that they would 



36 Booby's Bluffs 

follow the barrage very closely as long 
as they were not fired upon by flanking 
machine guns, but that if so fired upon 
they would wait for the support com- 
panies to clear out these groups, and 
would then go forward; that A and D 
Companies would take up extended or- 
der formation as soon as the enemy's 
counter-barrage commenced; that all 
would at once obtain extra ammunition 
from the wagons some 400 yards to the 
southeast at the road fork to this farm 
house. 

Captains A and C were then dis- 
missed, saluted, and returned to their 
companies. But I had some routine 
work to settle with Captains B and D. 
Captain B had submitted his pay roll 
only two days before, and there were 
many signatures short. I ordered him 
to go at once to his company, secure 
these signatures, and return to me with 
the pay roll. I took occasion to lecture 
him on the necessity of doing this work 
properly. Captain D had not correctly 
made out his ration return, as it showed 
that he reported more men needed ra- 
tions than his morning report showed 
were in his company. This was a very 
serious error and I feared that an in- 
spector might come around at any min- 
ute and discover that one of my com- 
pany commanders had asked for more 



Second Solution 37 

rations than he was entitled to. He 
might be court-martialed for embezzle- 
ment ; so I hastened to order Captain D 
to go to his company, look up his 
records, and submit a proper return 
at once. 

I then went over the day's papers 
with Lieutenant Swift. They were in 
very bad shape, and I took occasion to 
tell him that he must never let anything 
interfere with his duties as adjutant. 
In two cases, the additions on the 
morning reports were incorrect. In 
Company A's report the remarks and 
the figures did not agree. I sent for 
Captain A to come to battalion head- 
quarters and correct his error. I took 
occasion to censure him for careless- 
ness in making such an error — one 
which a seven-year-old boy would scorn 
to make. My last duty consisted in 
writing an official letter to Lieutenant 
Bright, directing him to explain in writ- 
ing his absence from battalion head- 
quarters, without permission, while I 
was away at Colonel R's. 

These very important duties kept me 
busy until 1.30 a. m., but at last all were 
settled and I could go to sleep. Leaving 
word that I be called at 3.30, I soon 
slept soundly. 

At 3.30 a. m., Lieutenant Swift 
waked me up, as I had ordered. I must 



38 Booby's Bluffs 

say this for Lieutenant Swift — he is 
reliable. I can always be sure that 
he will do what I tell him to do; that 
is, unless I tell him not to assume any 
authority in my absence. It seems that 
I can not teach him to leave everything 
to me. Always, when I am away, I 
find on my return that Lieutenant Swift 
has done something or commanded 
something which in the old army was 
always left to the major. 

However, Lieutenant Swift had, for 
once, done right in deciding something 
without referring the matter to me. 
During the night several officers of 
tanks, machine guns, signal troops, and 
stokes mortars had reported. He had 
put them in the potato room, and told 
them that I would see them in the 
morning. I did not commend Lieuten- 
ant Swift, as I did not approve of his 
taking any action without consulting 
me, but I was secretly pleased that I 
had not been obliged to see them. 

I did not know much about these 
new-fangled weapons of warfare, and 
I knew that, in the last analysis, the 
doughboy would have to take the po- 
sition. Therefore, I decided to let them 
alone, and see them after I had taken 
the position. In this decision, I fol- 
lowed a system or policy that I had 
learned or inherited from Colonel Puff 



Second Solution 39 

and other commanding officers, viz., 
when confronted with some conditions 
with which you have not had time to 
familiarize yourself, the best plan is to 
just say nothing, and, in general, the 
situation will work itself out. In this 
case, the doughboy would capture the 
position, and these new-fangled ideas 
would just work themselves out. 

The same plan is followed by our 
most successful statesmen. They form 
committees and boards when they do 
not wish to come to a prompt decision. 
The question just dies out, from lack 
of interest due to the length of time 
since it was originally brought forward. 
I happen to remember that the War 
of 1812 was caused by the British ex- 
ercising the Right of Search, yet the 
peace treaty some years later did not 
mention the question of Right of 
Search. 

At any rate, I went out on the field, 
leaving the officers of tanks, machine 
guns, etc., in their room, to sleep during 
the battle. 

On the field itself, everything seemed 
to be going all right. I spent the time 
until 4.25 going over orders with the 
captains and their subordinates. 

My captains were young and enthu- 
siastic, and I had no reason to think 
that they had not done everything in 



40 Booby's Bluffs 

their power. But they lacked the 
broader experience that I had derived 
from my years of war. I questioned 
the lieutenants and some of the older 
sergeants regarding their duty in the 
coming battle. All seemed well in- 
structed and all expressed a stern dis- 
position to carry out their orders in the 
grim military manner which has always 
been the sign of the true soldier. I 
took occasion to call special attention 
to the necessity of stopping and holding 
their formation if enfiladed by machine 
guns, as I had learned from the First 
Solution what a horrible slaughter was 
possible with machine guns enfilading 
a line. 

The men themselves seemed to be 
in excellent condition, strong and de- 
termined. They were not disposed to 
be enthusiastic, but they were ready 
for battle. Quickly and quietly they 
carried out the commands of their supe- 
riors, and in every way showed the 
spirit of military discipline which I had 
instilled into them. 

I happened to notice that one poor 
fellow was limping as he marched 
along. On inquiry, I learned that his 
feet were blistered as a result of poor 
fitting of his shoes. I was forced to 
let him go along, but I made a note of 
his name, platoon, and company, in 



Second Solution 41 

order to write to his commander for 
an official explanation as soon as the 
battle was over. 

At 4.25 the line was formed as in 
the First Solution. At 4.30 the bar- 
rage started, and surprised me a great 
deal, as I had never been near a bar- 
rage before. However, I know that 
war is a matter of life and death, and 
that the unexpected is to be expected; 
so I simply gritted my teeth and gave 
the orders for the advance. My men 
marched grimly forward as in the First 
Solution. They were promptly enfi- 
laded by Red machine guns as soon as 
the barrage passed the trees on the 
south side of the bend in Booby's Creek 
at 344.6-729.3. As one man, the troops 
stopped, and stood there, except those 
who fell. Truly these were magnificent 
soldiers. But the lieutenant waved his 
hand to me, pointing to the woods, and 
I at once understood. I ran over to 
D Company, and commanded Captain 
D to send forward a platoon to capture 
the Red machine guns. Before I could 
say anything more, Lieutenant Swift 
interrupted with a very foolish ques- 
tion: "Shall not the line lie down?" 
I had failed to include in my orders 
a statement to the effect that the line 
would lie down when enfiladed, until 
the machine guns had been silenced. 



42 Booby's Bluffs 

I could not think of everything, and 
those captains of mine were allowing 
their men to stand and be slaughtered 
instead of ordering them to lie down. 
I directed Lieutenant Swift to see that 
they received the order to lie down, 
and again turned to watch the platoon 
of Company D in its attack on the 
machine guns. 

Captain D was the least efficient of 
my captains, and I had least confidence 
in him. Only three days before he had 
asked me to tell him something about 
how to take machine guns. My reply 
was: "The only way to take machine 
guns is to go after them." 1 So, now, I 
wanted to see if Captain D had learned 
the lesson I had so grimly imparted. 
It seemed that he had understood the 
lesson, but it was again forced upon me 
that I was not able to rely upon great 
intelligence from my subordinates. 

The platoon had actually started for 
that machine gun in column of squads. 
I had not time to explain to Captain D, 
so I ran forward to the platoon, catch- 
ing it just before it reached the creek 
bottom, and ordered "As skirmishers!" 
Luckily for me and for the platoon, 
the machine gunners were playing on 
the line of Company C, which they 
enfiladed, and they did not notice my 



1 Actual words of a colonel of infantry in 
one of our most famous divisions. 



Second Solution 43 

approach. So the platoon, with me at 
its head, burst upon them and captured 
the whole party, two guns and some 
twenty men. Just at this moment the 
enemy counter-barrage came down on 
Companies A and D in support; but 
they quickly deployed into skirmish 
line and lay down. They escaped utter 
annihilation, thanks to my foresight in 
giving them these orders. 

Promptly upon cessation of machine- 
gun fire, the line rose — what was left 
of it — and started forward. Again I 
took my place in the center. The two 
support companies, A and D, advanced 
by rushes in order to avoid the enemy 
counter-barrage, which was very heavy 
on Company D. Everything was going 
along all right. But it did not remain 
so. The barrage was about 500 yards 
ahead, and I noticed that on the right 
Company B started to double time in 
order to catch up with it again. Com- 
pany C on the left also started to double 
time, but just then some more enemy 
machine guns in the woods south of 
the creek, which had been passed by our 
barrage some twenty minutes before, 
opened up on us, and again my left 
was enfiladed. Company C on the left 
at once halted, and lay down ; but Com- 
pany B on the right continued its 
march. I was in despair. It looked as 



44 Booby's Bluffs 

though everything went wrong unless 
I myself was in charge. I ran toward 
Company B in order to halt it until the 
machine guns had been silenced, other- 
wise we would soon have no line at all. 

Before I reached the company, a shell 
struck Lieutenant Swift in the hand, 
or rather on the hand, for it took away 
his whole hand. I stopped at once to 
apply first aid, and bound -up his arm 
securely. Casually, I remembered that 
every man of my battalion fully under- 
stood how to apply first aid. It was a 
matter upon which I had insisted dur- 
ing the training period. However, I 
realized that there were other things 
of equal importance, when Lieutenant 
Swift asked me where he could find the 
station for slightly wounded. I did not 
know; Colonel R's order had given it, 
but I had casually passed it over as not 
applying to me. Poor Lieutenant Swift 
had to start to the rear, with a vague 
hope of finding it. Hundreds of others 
were doing the same thing. 

Meanwhile, Company B had marched 
so far ahead that I could not hope to 
stop it. No one ever seemed to think 
that he should act on his own initiative. 
Everyone waited for me to do every- 
thing. Well, Company B was gone, and 
I supposed it would stop some time ; or 
at least, I would soon extricate Com- 



Second Solution 45 

pany C from its dilemma, and under 
my leadership it would advance more 
rapidly than Company B, and the line 
would be reestablished. 

I looked to the left to see what was 
being done by Company D, the left 
support company. Just as I had ex- 
pected, it was also waiting for orders. 
I could not be everywhere in the field 
at once, and I had not time to go over 
to Company D and again personally 
lead a platoon to capture the machine 
guns which were enfilading our left. I 
called out a corporal who was lying in 
the grass near me, and told him to go 
over to Captain D and tell him to send 
forward another platoon to capture the 
machine guns on our left; then to go 
forward to the platoon somewhere near 
the machine guns that we had captured 
and tell its commander to advance 
against them when I advanced with 
some men from Company C. The cor- 
poral started off at a run, but I had to 
call him back and make him salute 
properly in order to be sure that he 
had understood his orders. 

I waited a few minutes, and saw that 
the corporal arrived safely at Company 
D. Very promptly a platoon moved 
out. Horror of horrors! It started 
for me instead of for the machine guns. 
Evidently, the corporal had misunder- 



46 Booby's Bluffs 

stood my message. I could rely on no 
one. I ran to the platoon, and asked 
the lieutenant what his orders were. 
He said that he had been told to report 
to me with his platoon to capture some 
machine guns. As though I carried the 
machine guns around with me ! I was 
very much displeased, and I took occa- 
sion to tell the lieutenant that he should 
stop to think over his orders, and be 
sure that they were reasonable. The 
lieutenant said that he had always be- 
lieved this to be correct, but he remem- 
bered how one day in a lecture, I had 
quoted, with much emphasis, the words 
of Tennyson: 

Theirs not to reason why, 
Theirs not to make reply, 
Theirs but to do and die. 

and he also remembered that only a 
half hour before I had taken command 
of a platoon and captured some machine 
guns, consequently he thought I wanted 
to do it again. I drew myself up and 
told the lieutenant that if I wanted 
any advice from him, I would ask for it. 
Just then, the machine gun opened 
upon us, and I had to take command 
of the platoon. I felt that I could not 
rely upon the lieutenant, as he had 
shown such lack of initiative. I formed 
the men as skirmishers, placed myself 
at their head, commanded "Fix BAYO- 



Second Solution 47 

NETS" and "CHARGE" and away we 
went after the machine guns. Bravely 
my men followed me, although the ma- 
chine gun was mowing them down like 
a scythe. Twice the fire swept from 
right to left, but missed me each time. 
The third time I was not so lucky. 
Two bullets hit me in the left leg, shat- 
tering the knee and breaking the hip 
bone. I was out of the fight, and pos- 
sibly a cripple for life. Lieutenant 
Bright at once applied first aid, and 
sent three men in different directions 
to find a litter to take me back. 

While I was lying there, in a semi- 
conscious condition, many things hap- 
pened. The remainder of the platoon 
carried on the charge, and silenced the 
machine guns. Company C rose and 
started forward a third time, but was 
soon stopped again, and what was left 
of the company seemed to stop for 
good. A lieutenant from Company B 
came to say that Captain B had passed 
over hill 407 and had reached the creek 
bottom, where he was digging in, as 
cur barrage had already stopped for at 
least ten minutes on the ridge beyond. 
I happened to remember that Colonel 
R's orders said it would stop for twenty 
minutes and then go forward again. 
Captain B's lieutenant wanted to know 
what Captain B should do. Should he 



48 Booby's Bluffs 

advance with the regiment on his right, 
or should he wait for Company C on 
his left, which seemed a doubtful propo- 
sition, as he had seen nothing of Com- 
pany C for some time. I struggled to 
tell him to wait for Company C, as he 
was ordered, but I could not make my- 
self understood. Lieutenant Bright re- 
plied for me, or rather he replied: 
"Tell Captain B that Major List is 
badly wounded and cannot continue; 
that Captain A is in command; that 
neither I nor anyone else knows any- 
thing whatever about what Colonel R's 
plans are, as Major List never tells us 
anything, but does it all himself. That 
he will have to act as he thinks best, or 
get new orders from Captain A." I 
struggled to rise and tell him to carry 
out his orders exactly as I had given 
them — that "orders were orders," but 
the loss of blood and the pain were too 
much for me, and I again sank back 
into unconsciousness. Among my many 
troubles, I remembered, with a great 
feeling of satisfaction, that I was so 
badly wounded that I would not have 
to hunt for the station for slightly 
wounded. I smiled with pleasure at 
this advantage — and woke up. 

Evidently my subconscious mind was 
working a little better. I had learned 
several more lessons, as follows : 



Second Solution 49 

5. Do not do it all yourself; let 
others do their own work, even if not 
done quite so well as you could do it. 

6. There are more ways to take ma- 
chine guns than simply to "go after 
them." 

7. The subordinates should be fully 
informed of so much of the situations 
and plans as may be necessary for them 
to carry out their own duties, coordi- 
nate with others, and assume additional 
duties if necessary. 

8. Be sure to make your messages 
so clear that they cannot possibly be 
misunderstood. 



THIRD SOLUTION" 

AT 6 P. M. I attended the confer- 
ence at Colonel R's headquarters. 
Colonel R was very serious; 
seemed much impressed with the fact 
that there was going to be a battle, and 
it w T as evident that to him battles were 
very serious affairs. This was but nat- 
ural, in view of the fact that Colonel R 
had never had the opportunities for 
thorough education that I had been so 
fortunate as to obtain. In my school, we 
had battles nearly every day. I remem- 
ber one week in which we had six bat- 
tles, and in every one of these battles I 
made an excellent mark. So, now it was 
with me simply a question of applying 
what I had learned. 

Colonel R went over the whole situa- 
tion very carefully, and at once I saw 
that I had been selected to command 
the assault battalion. In fact, Colonel R 
in almost as many words said to me 
that I had been selected because of my 
standing in the schools, and because 
of the fact that I was thoroughly fa- 
miliar with all of the requirements of 
making an attack. Colonel R pointed 
out in his order that I had been given 
the following troops to help me : 

1 signal detachment 

1 company of engineers 

2 75-cm accompanying guns 

51 



52 Booby's Bluffs 

1 Stokes mortar section 

1 company machine guns 

2 platoons tanks 

He also stated that other artillery, 
machine guns, and Stokes mortars 
would help me in ways as pointed out 
by him ; but I did not listen particularly, 
as I did not see that it was of especial 
interest to me. Always, I had been 
taught to fight my own battles with the 
forces in my command; and I never 
sought outside help. I wanted to fight 
only with the troops at my disposal; 
if I couldn't get the other troops under 
my command, I did not care particularly 
what happened to them. 

It had been impressed upon us time 
after time at the schools that only one 
man should be in control of troops. He 
should be responsible for the results, 
therefore, I expected to get the results 
with the troops directly under me and to 
consider no others. 

Colonel R read his orders and went 
over his maps with us, telling us at the 
same time that he would give us copies. 
This he did. Evidently, he had never 
learned the approved system whereby 
the orders are dictated by officers of the 
rank of Colonel and less, and copies 
are made only in cases of troops com- 
manded by generals. Of course, the 
book always states that the orders (by 



Third Solution 53 

a colonel or less) are thus and so. 
which "if engrossed would be as fol- 
lows," giving the exact orders as was 
in this case so erroneously given us 
by Colonel R in writing. Altogether, 
however, Colonel R did very well for a 
man without the advantages possessed 
by those who had been to the schools, 
and he especially showed great ability 
in selecting for the most responsible 
positions those who had been to the 
schools. 

On my way back to my battalion 
headquarters, I determined that there 
should be no errors in my handling of 
the orders as was done by Colonel R. 
He, poor man, had not possessed my 
advantages, and could be excused. 
However, I would not make such mis- 
takes. 

As soon as I arrived at my battalion 
headquarters, I said to Lieutenant Swift 
(my adjutant) : 

(1) The enemy holds the country to 
the west of us. We attack tomorrow 
morning. 

(2) My battalion leads the assault 
and takes the position. 

(3) You will send messages to the 
captains and staff to be here for con- 
ference at 9 p. m. 

When the officers of tanks, engineers, 
etc., report, you will tell them to be 
here also at the conference. 



54 Booby's Bluffs 

(4) You will issue the necessary in- 
structions regarding supplies. 

(5) Messages to me here. 

It will be noticed that I issued these 
orders exactly in accordance with the 
approved method in troop leading. 
Many times I had seen the great ad- 
vantages of this method. Only once 
before had I employed it so effectively, 
viz., when we were ordered to get 
ready to go to the Mexican border. 
That time I received a telegram at 2 
a. m. to be ready to move at 5 a. m. 
No previous preparations had been 
made, but to a man with my educa- 
tion it was very easy. I promptly went 
over to the company office, sent for the 
first sergeant, and said to him : 

(1) There is trouble in Mexico. 
Many U. S. troops are going to the 
border. 

(2) This company is to be ready to 
move at 5 a. m. 

(3) You will make the necessary ar- 
rangements. 

(4) You will issue the necessary in- 
structions regarding supplies. 

(5) Messages to me here. 

There are three things to be noticed 
about these two orders : 

1. They are exactly according to the 
troop leading form, consequently noth- 
ing is omitted, nothing is forgotten. 

2. They are short. It is always desir- 
able to inform the subordinates of only 



Third Solution 55 

so much as is necessary for their par- 
ticular purposes. 

3. They "pass the buck." It will be 
noticed that in both orders, the matter 
of supply is neatly handled. Only a 
man of my education could have done 
that so well. I did not know exactly 
what to do about the supply, so I neatly 
passed it on to the next man. Possibly, 
he will pass it on the next man, which 
is O. K., as eventually it will reach the 
person who can handle it. 

This is an idea that is learned by 
much practice; always the order even- 
tually reaches some one who can do it. 
To repeat for clearness. I do not know 
exactly what to do about supply, so I 
pass it to the next one. If he knows 
what to do, he will do it; otherwise 
his order to his subordinate will con- 
tain the same words viz: "You will is- 
sue the necessary instructions regarding 
supplies." Eventually, it will reach the 
person who knows how to "issue the 
necessary instructions regarding sup- 
plies." Truly, it is a great advantage 
to have gone to the schools. Some less 
educated officers would have spent much 
time trying to learn just what were the 
necessary instruction regarding supplies. 

Having started the wheels to turning 
by my order as issued above, I began 
to work out the solution of the present 



56 Booby's Bluffs 

problem. In all of my experience, I had 
never yet seen the problem which I 
could not solve in the required four 
hours. So with my experience, I felt 
sure that I could solve this one easily 
within two hours. At once, I ran across 
certain very serious difficulties. How- 
ever, I shall give here in a brief manner 
my Estimate of the Situation, as, at 
the schools, we were always required 
to make an Estimate of the Situation, 
even if we did not actually write it down 
in the problem. 

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 

Mission. — Very simple ; to drive back 
the Reds in our front, on our sector. 

The Enemy. — The Reds were some-, 
where to the west of us. I called in 
Lieutenant Bright (my intelligence of- 
ficer) and asked him what he had been 
able to learn. He was very unsatisfac- 
tory in his reports. It seems that he 
had talked with the officers of the regi- 
ment which we had relieved, and he had 
received very different opinions. Some 
of them said that the Reds were east 
of Booby's Creek, some of them said 
they were west of it. One of our pa- 
trols had returned with information that 
they were in the creek bottom and an- 
other said that they were on top of the 
ridge west of Booby's Creek. This was 



Third Solution 57 

all very confusing, and not at all as I 
had been taught. Many times, I had 
seen cases where our instructors had 
manifestly put "jokers" in the problems, 
but they had never given us erroneous 
information concerning the enemy. It 
is true that on one occasion, an instruc- 
tor had told us that we should not rely 
on every message that we received, but 
the very next day another instructor 
had told us that we should do so, hence 
there was no confusion. Likewise, there 
was no information as to enemy's 
strength and his probable intentions. 
Altogether, the Estimate of the Situa- 
tion was not very complete as regards 
The Enemy. 

Our Own Troops. — This was very 
easy. General A commanded all of our 
troops, Colonel R commanded my regi- 
ment. Our particular regiment was to 
receive support (I had not paid any 
attention to the special manner) from 
special artillery and machine guns. In 
addition I was to receive support di- 
rectly from 

1 signal detachment 

1 company of engineers 

2 artillery 75 cm accompanying guns 
1 Stokes mortar section 

1 company machine guns 

2 platoons tanks. 

This was all very easy, except that, 



58 Booby's Bluffs 

in the school, we had never used Stokes 
mortars and tanks. This did not worry 
me a great deal. I simply decided to 
keep them in reserve until called for. As 
to the rest, it was very simple. I simply 
followed the approved form as follows : 

(a) Signal detachment: If wireless, 
they always set up every hour on the 
hour for 10 minutes. If wire, they al- 
ways maintain the necessary communi- 
cations. 

(b) Company of engineers; Again, 
it was quite simple. The engineers al- 
ways build a bridge or destroy a bridge. 
Also, they guard the artillery. In this 
case, they would build a bridge over 
Booby's Creek. The exact position made 
no difference. I decided to put it in the 
middle of my sector. As to guarding the 
artillery, I would simply have them 
guard the 2 accompanying guns. 

(c) 2 artillery 75 cm, accompanying 
guns: In none of my problems had I 
been given such a thing as an accom- 
panying gun. Evidently this was some- 
thing new of Colonel R's. However, 
the answer was easy. Always the artil- 
lery is ordered to take position near 

and support the attack. I would 

have it do so. 

(d) 1 Stokes mortar section: Nothing 
of this kind had been used at the schools 
in their problems. As we had always 
won the battles, I decided that the best 



Third Solution 59 

thing to do was to put this Stokes mor- 
tar section in the reserve where I could 
call on it when needed. 

(e) 1 company machine guns: This 
was fairly easy; or rather, would have 
been perfectly easy if we had not al- 
ready had those 2 accompanying guns. 
Always, the machine guns had sup- 
ported the attack, and always the artil- 
lery had supported the attack. Now, in 
no problem had I ever seen both sup- 
porting the attack. Therefore, I decided 
to have the machine guns "assist" the 
attack. Incidentally, the machine guns 
always took position on some prominent 
hill ; so I had to look up a hill for them, 
which was very easy. 

(/) 2 platoons tanks: Like Stokes 
mortars, these were new paraphernalia 
to me; therefore, as with the Stokes 
mortars, their best position was in the 
reserve. 

Plans. — At first, I thought that this 
was the easiest part of it. I had always 
managed to evolve some plan in accord- 
ance with some previous problem in the 
school. This matter of plans had been 
very difficult, because of the lack of 
system at the schools. Time and again 
I had asked the instructors for some- 
thing definite on which to base my plans. 
Invariably, they had said that it "de- 
pended upon circumstances," and we 



60 Booby's Bluffs 

could get nothing definite. To me, this 
was the greatest weakness in the schools. 
There was no accuracy at all, and it had 
become a great guessing contest. How- 
ever, after a month of fuming and fuss- 
ing about this lack of system, about 
this continual harping on the fact that 
they would not tell us whether it was 
best to envelop the flank or to make a 
frontal attack; about whether it was 
best to defend with three companies 
in the firing line and one in support or 
with two companies in the firing line 
and two in support and about a lot of 
similar cases of lack of definiteness on 
the part of our instructors, I made out 
what I called my "Dope Sheet of In- 
structors" and I began to acquire great 
military ability, and incidentally, good 
marks. The following are a few ex- 
tracts from my "Dope Sheet of Instruc- 
tors": 

Instructor Remarks 

Brown: Great for detail; decision of 
little importance ; execu- 
tion of decision very im- 
portant ; nothing positive 
as to attack or defend 

Jones : Always attacks ; hit his deci- 
sion; makes no difference 
about execution ; can leave 
out whole regiments, he 
would never cut for it 

Smith : Always attacks ; always en- 
velops a flank; strong for 



Third Solution 61 

power of rifle; always say 
something about the infan- 
trymen being last resort; 
say little about artillery; 
strong on "fire superior- 
ity." 

Williams: Always relies on Artillery; 
wins the battle with it; 
look out for problem of 
river crossing. 

Wright: Always defends; preferably 
two companies in front 
line ; great for marking on 
details; must put down 
every squad; counts them. 

All: Pick out problem like their 

last previous one; study 
and follow it. 

Now here was I at last with a real 
problem before me, and I did not see 
just what plan I should follow. There 
was no last previous problem like this 
one, because we had never had a frontal 
attack, and no Red instructor had taught 
at the schools. Always we had en- 
veloped a flank or had defended a line. 
I decided that I must proceed without 
enveloping a flank, since I could not 
defend. However, I could at least apply 
a part of my learning. Always we had 
put two companies in the holding at- 
tack and two companies in the envelop- 
ing attack — now, I could put two com- 
panies in the fighting line and two com- 
panies in the support line. The matter 



62 Booby's Bluffs 

of fire superiority worried me consider- 
ably. Many times I had asked the ques- 
tion of just how one could determine 
when he had obtained "fire superiority," 
and had been told that it "depended 
upon circumstances," but that in a real 
battle it would be so simple that it could 
not be mistaken. 

Decision. — To attack. 

Details of Decision. — (See Orders). 

Orders.— At 9.00 p. m. I dictated the 
following orders to the assembled of- 
ficers, except that the officers who were 
to be attached to help me with tanks, 
machine guns, etc., had not arrived, and 
Lieutenant Swift took notes for them : 

1. The Reds are to the west of us. 
Our army attacks tomorrow. 

2. This battalion and attached troops 
attack at 4.30 a. m. and drive back the 
Reds. 

3. (a) The 2 accompaying guns will 

take position near this farm- 
house and support the attack. 

(b) Companies B and C will form 
the firing line. 

(c) Companies A and D will form 
the support. 

(d) Machine gun company will 
proceed to hill 441 and assist 
the attack. 

(e) Two platoons of engineers will 
build a bridge across Booby's 
Creek at 343.5-729.5 ; time to 
be given by me later ; two pla- 
toons will protect the artillery. 



Third Solution 63 

(/) Signal troops will connect me 
here with Regimental Head- 
quarters and with the 2 ac- 
companying guns. 
(g) 2 platoons tanks and 1 Stokes 
mortar section will constitute 
the reserve, take position in 
ravine at 345.6-729.7 and 
await further orders. 

4. Extra ammunition will be obtained 
at road junction about 400 yards south- 
east of here. Each unit will make its 
own arrangements about other supplies. 
Station for slightly wounded at 346.8- 
728.8. 

5. Messages to me at center of sup- 
port. 

Owing to my great experience, the 
actual speaking of this order occupied 
me only a few minutes. By 9.30 p. m. 
I was asleep. 

At 3.30 a. m. Lieutenant Swift woke 
me up, and I went out on the field as in 
previous solutions. The barrage opened 
at 4.30 just as at other times and we 
started forward. Very soon, the bar- 
rage cleared the machine guns in the 
woods south of the bend and the men 
in Company C began to fall. However, 
as I had been taught at school and as I 
had taught my men that the support 
was not for small reverses, it was the 
duty of the captain of Company C to 
take care of his left. This he did very 
well. He sent several squads in that 



64 Booby's Bluffs 

direction and about half of the company 
continued forward behind the barrage. 
Very soon, more enemy machine guns 
raised their heads after the barrage had 
passed, and soon all of Company C 
vvas engaged in a fight to its left, being 
entirely at right angles to its original 
front. 

This was a condition of very little 
importance to me, as I had expected 
difficulties, but I very quickly and in 
a truly Napoleonic manner diagnosed 
the situation. The Reds were south of 
the creek. Therefore their left (our 
right) was their weak point. If I could 
defeat their left, I would swing around 
and envelop their right and it would 
have to fall back. In fact, the whole 
battle at once assumed a familiar aspect 
to me, viz., an envelopment; and I let 
my mind stray from its concentrated 
thinking just long enough to record a 
few stray sentences of appreciation of 
my old instructor, Major Smith, who 
said that it was always best to envelop 
a flank. As a matter of fact, until my 
right defeated the Reds in its front, I 
was the one being enveloped, but at any 
rate I was on familiar ground; and as 
soon as I drove back their left, I would 
swing around and envelop them, and all 
would be just as I had learned in so 
many approved solutions. 



Third Solution 65 

Being now on familiar ground, the 
rest was easy. I promptly left Com- 
pany C to fight its own battle, ordered 
Company D into the gap on the left 
of Company B, placed myself at the 
head of the remaining support, Com- 
pany A, and continued forward. The 
enemy's counter-barrage came down on 
us at the same time as in previous solu- 
tions, but the companies quickly formed 
as skirmishers and we continued for- 
ward, Companies B and D some 60 
yards behind the barrage, Company C 
almost at right angles to them and now 
fighting in the creek, bottom north of 
the woods. Company A advancing by 
rushes and lying down to avoid the 
enemy's counter-barrage. Our losses 
were quite severe, and I mentally re- 
minded myself that of all losses, only 
some 20 per cent actually died, so I con- 
tinued on my way serenely confident. 
Company C was having difficulties, and 
Captain C sent me a message asking for 
reinforcements; but I sent back word 
that I would soon envelop the Red left 
and the Reds in front of him would 
retreat. 

In this formation of attack, we con- 
tinued forward. Very soon, the enemy 
counter-barrage was passed and I 
formed up Company A in line of pla- 
toon columns, as I could thereby keep 



66 Booby's Bluffs 

better control of this reserve. I remem- 
bered distinctly a statement that was 
often quoted at the school, viz "Always 
retain a formed reserve; it will serve 
to clinch the victory or to prevent utter 
defeat." I had tried to get them to tell 
me when to use it to "clinch the victory," 
but again was told that it "depended 
upon circumstances." Always the same 
old dodge to avoid giving the student 
some dope on the solution. Even so, 
now in real battle, I had the formed 
reserve and I was soon to make the en- 
veloping attack. Company C was mak- 
ing the holding attack — nothing was left 
undone. We continued on our way, 
following the barrage. The barrage 
passed over hill 407 and its ridge to 
the south, crossed Booby's Creek, pro- 
ceeded steadily nearly to the top of hill 
442, then stopped for the 20 minutes 
as originally laid down in Colonel R's 
order and as stated in previous solution. 
Promptly, and in a manner which 
showed the effectiveness of my training 
them to depend upon themselves in un- 
expected situations, Captains B and D 
ordered their troops to lie down until 
the barrage started forward again. 
Truly did this demonstrate my faith in 
their judgment and in my training. I 
could have told them that the barrage 
would stop for these 20 minutes just 



Third Solution 67 

this side of the top of hill 442, but I 
hoped and expected that they would act 
just as they did act; so my faith was 
justified. Very soon, as the enemy's 
fire was quite deadly, they fell back a 
few yards to the creek bottom, prepared 
to go forward quickly. This was again 
a tribute to my training of them in self- 
reliance. Meanwhile, I had halted the 
reserve, Company A, in a very advan- 
tageous position at the road junction 
about 450 yards southeast of hill 407 
where they could move (1) over the 
hill to help Company B (2) along the 
road to the southwest to help Company 
D, or (3) almost due south to help 
Company C. The company was kept in 
line of platoon columns, as I wished it 
to be well in hand. While we awaited 
the further advance of the barrage, I 
felt that everything was satisfactory. 
The enemy's counter-barrage had ceased 
back of us; the fire of Company C on 
my left was dying down, thereby show- 
ing that the Reds were retiring as a 
result of my threat to their left flank; 
and to the front Companies B and D 
were in a strong position, almost a na- 
tural trench. 

For the next few minutes, I diverted 
myself by watching the antics of an 
enemy aeroplane just over our heads. 
It was firing at something, and its fire 



68 Booby's Bluffs 

seemed to be in the nature of a signal. 
As I had unfortunately not brought 
with me any of the signal men, I could 
make no real progress in reading the 
signals, but at any rate, it was excellent 
flying. Several times the aeroplane cir- 
cled directly over my head and each 
time dropped a few star shells. One 
of my men remarked that it was very 
pretty, but that it was not war; and I 
felt a kind of superiority over these ig- 
norant Reds who were so poorly trained 
that one of their airmen would fly 
around in circles and drop beautiful 
shells when it was so evident that we 
were winning and he would surely be 
more useful elsewhere. 

Some ten minutes after the barrage 
had assumed its stationary position on 
the front slope of hill 442, I heard the 
rat-tat-tat of enemy machine guns from 
the direction of hill 443. I gave the 
matter no especial attention, as we were 
not injured. However, Lieutenant 
Swift became very much worried. He 
rushed up to me with his map and said 
"We must take that hill 443 ; our bar- 
rage has passed there, and they are now 
enfilading Companies B and D on one 
side and Company C on the other. I 
saw his point, and at once ordered two 
platoons of Company D to take the hill 
at a double time; to stop for nothing 



Third Solution 69 

except to fix bayonets ; not to fire a sin- 
gle shot. I feared that it was too late; 
and so it proved. Here I had been con- 
tentedly waiting ten minutes doing noth- 
ing whatever while the enemy machine 
guns on hill 443 had been adjusting 
their sights with occasional shots and 
placing themselves in perfect position to 
enfilade all of the troops I had except 
this reserve. I was not sure that this 
was the time to "clinch the victory," 
but I was sure that if it did not hurry, 
it could not "prevent utter defeat." 

Hardly had the two platoons from 
Company D started before I received 
messages from the captains of all three 
companies, and each said that he must 
have reinforcements, that his men were 
being absolutely destroyed by the en- 
filading machine guns. I turned to give 
orders for the two remaining platoons 
to also go for this hill 443 ; but I never 
gave the orders. Just as I opened my 
mouth, some five hundred shells ex- 
ploded in the exact spot where my two 
remaining platoons were standing. The 
air was full of arms and legs ; and when 
the dust cleared I could see nothing of 
those two platoons except a few lone 
men who were running and staggering 
away from this holocaust. It seems that 
the Red airman was not amusing him- 
self with those star shells ; he was point- 



70 Booby's Bluffs 

ting out our exact position, and the 
whole Red counter-barrage batteries 
plunked down one round on us at one 
time. Nothing was left of us, except 
myself and Lieutenants Swift and 
Bright. 

Being human like others in spite of 
my war training, I felt a decided aver- 
sion to my present location ; so I quickly 
started after those two platoons. And, 
in spite of the fact that they were going 
at full speed, I managed to catch them 
just as they reached the creek bottom to 
the northeast of hill 443. We went no 
farther because the firing had stopped 
on our right, and I was amazed to see 
a white flag waving over the positions 
of Companies B and D. On our left, 
the firing soon died out, and I concluded 
lhat Company C had hidden in the 
woods. Shortly after a message came 
to me from a sergeant of Company B 
to say that he had surrendered because 
the captain was dead and only some 40 
of his men were left. A corporal from 
Company D crawled along the creek and 
reported to me that he had escaped ; but 
that some 30 men and one wounded 
lieutenant had surrendered ; he supposed 
the rest were dead. No messages came 
from Company C, but desultory firing 
at odd times showed me that some few 
of the company were clearing the woods. 



Third Solution 71 

It appeared that I was commanding 
nearly all that was left of my battalion, 
now amounting to only two platoons. 

For a long time I held the creek bot- 
tom with those two platoons. Eight 
times, I tried to send a messenger to 
Colonel R, but each time saw the mes- 
senger caught by the sweep of several 
machine guns. I was puzzled as to how 
or when I should recognize the fact that 
either I or the Reds had "fire superior- 
ity." It was evident that out in the 
open, where those eight messengers had 
fallen, the Reds had "fire superiority"; 
but I was still holding my own in the 
creek bottom, I saw nothing to indicate 
that the Reds had "fire superiority" over 
me in the creek bottom. Of course, if 
the Reds had suddenly risen up in great 
numbers and had charged my position, 
then I would know that they had just 
a moment before had the "fire superior- 
ity"; but just at that moment I would 
have the fire superiority and would 
slaughter them as they advanced. We 
were safe from enfilade by the machine 
guns ; and I felt that "fire superiority" 
or no "fire superiority" we could hold 
on until help came. But when would 
it come? 

I still had a company of engineers 
waiting back there for orders to come 
forward to build a bridge; 1 company 



72 Booby's Bluffs 

of machine guns were somewhere on a 
hill top to the east (provided they had 
not moved or been destroyed) ; and 1 
section Stokes mortars and 1 platoon 
of tanks were in reserve. All I needed 
to do was to get a message back to 
them. But this I could not do. Bitterly 
did I regret that I had not brought 
with me a signal man; or had not at 
least ordered the signal troops to stretch 
a wire or make arrangements for visual 
signals. Six more messengers were 
sent ; but all fell under the machine gun 
fire. Lieutenant Bright, who knew the 
signal wig-wag code, tried many times 
to wigwag with his hat, but obtained no 
results. All of us searched our pockets 
for mirrors or anything that would re- 
flect sunlight, but we found nothing. 
There was no hope for it but to sell our 
lives as dearly as possible. 

Grimly, we held our position for two 
hours. The enemy may have thought 
they had "fire superiority," but I did not 
acknowledge it ; so we held on. Finally, 
about 8.00 a. m. a machine gun opened 
up in extension of our line to the north- 
west, and many men were immediately 
hit. I could not see the machine gun; 
but it was evident that a machine gun 
had slipped around and was now enfi- 
lading our line perfectly. Evidently, the 
Reds now had "fire superiority"; in 



Third Solution 73 

three minutes 50 per cent of us were 
hit. I surrendered. 

The Reds took us up to hill 443 and 
then over to the west of hill 442, where 
I met Captain B who had been brought 
in on a litter, as he was seriously 
wounded, but not killed as was reported 
by the sergeant. He said that everything 
went beautifully until the machine guns 
opened up in prolongation of his line. 
After that, his men tried to dig in, to 
hide, to run, but it was all useless. He 
was shot before he could put up a white 
flag, and over half of the company were 
shot before they finally put it up. If 
their surrender had been delayed some 
four minutes longer, there would have 
been no unwounded men to surrender. 
Company D men said about the same 
thing. 

As we marched westward, a column 
of prisoners guarded by a few Red 
soldiers, I looked about me; and I saw 
that the Red Infantry was compara- 
tively untouched; my whole battalion 
had been defeated by a few machine 
guns, who undoubtedly had fire super- 
iority when they enfiladed us. Also I 
saw that my idea of enveloping the Red 
left was utterly at fault. The Red left 
was miles to the north. All day we 
marched to the west, and finally stopped 
for the night in one of the passes of 



74 Booby's Bluffs 

the mountains. The scenery was beauti- 
ful ; but I had no eye for beauty. I was 
very tired, anc I sank to the ground, 

in utter exhaustion and woke 

up. 

My sub-conscious mind was evidently 
progressing somewhat. I now had a few 
more lessons at my command, viz: 

9. In modern warfare, with large 
forces, there are no real enveloping at- 
tacks ; a surprise flank attack is so easily 
delayed that it becomes a frontal attack. 
With interior units, it is of first im- 
portance to sweep the whole of the 
enemy's line at once. Any angle in your 
line exposes at least some of it, to en- 
filade fire, and any line exposed to en- 
filade fire is surely ruined. 

10. Signal troops should be used to 
connect you to other places. This means 
you should not often move but if forced 
to move, you should have the signal 
troops connect you in your new posi- 
tion. 

11. Engineers are good for something 
besides building bridges; also, they are 
not now often needed as artillery sup- 
ports. 

12. Accompanying guns should do 
more than shoot at things in general; 
they should have a target possibly 
changing, but always a target that you 
know. 



Third Solution 75 

13. Machine guns also need exact 
targets just as is the case with accom- 
panying guns. 

14. Stokes mortars and tanks do not 
belong in the reserve. 

15. "Fire superiority ,, is a matter of 
nerve; as long as you are winning, you 
have "fire superiority"; when you are 
losing, the enemy has "fire superiority" ; 
when you are doubtful whether or not 
you have "fire superiority," it is prob- 
able that you are winning but are afraid 
that you are losing. 






FOURTH SOLUTION 

IN order to be sure that I did not 
miss anything, and also to meet my 
old friend, Captain Strong, who 
was an old college mate of mine and who 
was now at Colonel R.'s headquarters, 
I started out about 5 :00 p. m. on my 
way to the conference scheduled for 
6:00 p. m. When about half way to 
headquarters, I ran across Billy Flight, 
another old college mate of mine, now 
in the aviation corps. Billy was just 
going up to take a view of the Red lines, 
and he invited me to go along. He as- 
sured me that he would return in time 
for me to reach headquarters by 6:00 
p. m. I seized this opportunity to take 
a ride over the Red lines in an aeroplane, 
and incidentally to learn something 
about the Red positions. We made the 
flight all right, but we did not see any 
trenches, because we spied a Red aero- 
plane which Billy and I chased for sev- 
eral miles until it ran us into a lot of 
other Red planes. Billy did some ex- 
pert divings and I had the thrill of my 
life while we were getting away from 
their neighborhood. 

This little encounter delayed us more 

than we had expected. I was some 15 

minutes late when I reached Colonel R.'s 

headquarters. I told the colonel the 

77 



78 Booby's Bluffs 

cause of the delay, and he said very little 
to me except that it was foolish to risk 
my life in such a manner. The Old Man 
was pretty serious. He did not say 
much to me about the delay, but two or 
three times he called me down as I was 
telling one of the other majors a joke 
about one of my lieutenants who had 
misunderstood my signals on a march 
and had turned his platoon off on the 
wrong road, making it necessary to hike 
some six extra miles in order to reach 
our position. The Colonel told me that 
I must remember that this was a matter 
of life and death, and that I must go 
after it with all my force, and win out. 
I told him that he could rely on me ; that 
I would be right there from the Kick-off 
to the Touch-down; that I had a team 
that couldn't be beaten by any bunch of 
Reds that were ever gotten together. 
This seemed to pacify him a little. 

The Old Man certainly was serious. 
Time and again, he called our attention 
to some special points in the order. I 
began to see that he felt that it was up 
to us. I noted everything down just as 
he wished. He had always been fair 
with me, and I certainly intended that 
nothing should go wrong because of any 
omission on my part. 

I realized that this war game was a 
little new and that there were some 



Fourth Solution 79 

points in it which required careful at- 
tention. I did not feel sure that I knew 
it all. I had been every minute on the 
job, and had recently been made a major 
because I had been so much on the job. 
At college, I had started in as a green 
man, and had made the Varsity team in 
some six weeks. Finally, in the last 
game, I had made the touch-down which 
won the game. 

Now, after all our practice, we were 
in for a real game. Even so, I did not 
intend to let my conceit lead me into 
errors; so every time Colonel R. men- 
tioned anything with emphasis, I noted 
it down so that I would be sure to at- 
tend to it. He specially told me not to 
let my line be enfiladed by machine guns ; 
not to think that I could do it all; not 
to fail to use all of the special troops 
that were assigned to help me. This was 
all old stuff that I had learned during 
the period of intensive training, but I 
noted it down just the same. If any- 
thing struck me as being in the least 
doubtful, I asked lots of questions until 
it was cleared up. Colonel R. always 
went into these points with me in great 
detail, and I finally felt that I had it all 
straight. At last we were dismissed and 
I returned to my headquarters in the 
farmhouse cellar. 

It was a jolly bunch that I found at 



80 Booby's Bluffs 

my headquarters. Lieutenant Swift was 
playing on a mouth organ and Lieutenant 
Bright was accompanying him with a 
guitar which he had found covered un- 
der some rubbish in the farmer's cellar. 
I told Lieutenant Swift to send for all 
of the bunch to meet me at 10 :00 p. m., 
at which time I expected the representa- 
tives of the signal troops, machine guns, 
stokes mortars, etc., to arrive and report 
to me. In fact, to be sure that they 
would come promptly, I telephoned to 
Captain Strong at Colonel R.'s head- 
quarters to hurry them up, as I wanted 
to get my orders all settled as soon as 
possible. 

While we were waiting for them to 
come, I asked Lieutenant Bright what 
he could tell me about the enemy's ma- 
chine guns, as Colonel R. had especially 
cautioned me not to let myself be en- 
filaded by machine guns. Lieutenant 
Bright said that he had talked with the 
Intelligence Officer and many other of- 
ficers of the regiment that we had re- 
lieved and had received reports from 
several of our own patrols, but that we 
were not positive of the Red position. 
He felt positive that there were no Reds 
east of Booby's Creek, but he felt sure 
of nothing on the other side. They 
might be anywhere. 

I noticed that it was now some 



Fourth Solution 81 

three hours before the meeting at 
10:00 p. m., and I told Lieutenant 
Bright that there was just time for us 
to go out on a patrol, and see what we 
could learn. Lieutenant Swift said that 
he would also like to go, but that no 
one would be left to take care of reports 
that might come in. I told him to let 
the old office run itself for once. So 
we three went out on a little patrol of 
our own, taking two of the headquarters 
orderlies along with us. 

It was quite an adventure, arid we 
were especially successful. We went to 
the bend in the creek, and followed 
along the north bank for about 300 
yards. At several places we heard Reds 
talking, and felt sure that they were 
placing machine guns in the woods on 
the south bank. Finally, just as a lark, 
we slipped across to the south side and 
captured two Reds who were by them- 
selves. However, one of them was quite 
brave, and he kept yelling out something 
which aroused the others and they came 
after us. We did not have the heart to 
shoot this Red soldier in order to keep 
him quiet, so we had to just tie them 
both and run away as fast as we could 
in order to save ourselves. We got 
away safely, though Lieutenant Swift 
was wounded in the arm and had to go 



82 Booby's Bluffs 

back to the hospital, thus leaving me 
with no adjutant. 

At 10 :00 p. m. all of the various of- 
ficers of the special troops and also the 
captains of my companies were with me 
at the farmhouse, and we set ourselves 
to work to see what we should do. First, 
we had a little gabfest in order to get 
acquainted, and I found two old friends 
among the special officers. Truly, it 
was a pleasure to see them. Then, I 
made them a little speech, in which I 
said that I knew all about my own team 
— the battalion — but that these new 
members of our team were beyond me 
and I wanted to ask each of them what 
he could do. 

(a) The signal detachment officer said 
he could keep me in touch with anything. 
I told him to do so — to keep me in touch 
no matter where I went. 

(b) The engineer officer said that his 
strong point was fighting, though no one 
ever believed him; that they always 
wanted him to build a bridge. Just to 
pacify him, I told him that I would 
make him our reserve for fighting. 

(c) The accompanying guns officer 
said that it was all foolishness about his 
accompanying me; that he would ac- 
company me by fire; that he would 
watch my line and keep his shells just 
a little ahead of it. This was approved. 



Fourth Solution 83 

(d) The Stokes mortar officer said 
that his long suit was shooting into 
ravines; so we told him very simply to 
shoot into Booby's Creek, that it was a 
whole ravine to itself. 

(e) The machine gun officer said that 
he was strongest on overhead barrages; 
that if I would just let him get indirect 
fire ahead of me, the Reds would wish 
they had never been born ; so I told him 
to watch me and keep ahead of me. 

(/) The tanks said he was good in 
open country, but that woods were bad 
for him. He was told to follow the 
barrage in the open country and destroy 
all machine guns that he found there. 

I then told Captains B and C that they 
would cover the front, north of the 
creek, at the usual distance apart of the 
skirmishers. I directed Captain D to 
take his whole company just back of 
the left flank, follow the barrage closely, 
and jump across Booby's Creek as fast 
as possible, and when the barrage passed 
the clump of woods, to capture those 
machine guns before they had time to 
open up on our line. Next, I told the 
captain of Company A and the engineers 
that they would be the reserve, and 
would follow behind the center, being 
careful to deploy as skirmishers and lie 
down in order to minimize the losses 
from the enemy's counter-barrage. 



84 Booby's Bluffs 

All of us then carefully studied the map 
for an objective. Always, during train- 
ing, we had been given an objective, and 
it had been impressed upon us that all 
of the experience of the English and 
French in Europe showed that an ob- 
jective must not be overrun. The dis- 
aster to the British at Cambrai had been 
more or less indefinitely charged to their 
failure to stop when their objective had 
been reached. In the trench fighting 
which we had practiced in our training 
our objective had in no case been more 
than 1,200 yards away, and generally it 
had been about 800 yards. So we all 
searched the map for an objective about 
800 yards away. We could find none 
nearer than the line of Booby's Creek, 
some 1,500 yards distant, so, to my great 
regret, I had to designate Booby's 
Creek as the objective. I started to ring 
up Colonel R. and ask him if this was 
too far an objective. We noticed in the 
order that the artillery barrage would 
halt for 20 minutes on the slope beyond 
Booby's Creek, so it was decided that 
this was the best place for the objective. 
All were then told to carry lots of hand 
grenades, as my training experience 
showed we always needed lots of them 
to capture an objective. 

After our work had been completed 
we all felt satisfied, and sat around for 



Fourth Solution 85 

some two hours reminiscing about the 
old times at our various alma maters. 
Finally, about 11 :00 p. m., we gathered 
around the council table, and sang a 
few songs : "It's Always Fair Weather," 
"Way Down Yonder in the Cornfield," 
"Adaline." It was 1 :00 a. m. before 
the party broke up. 

At 3 :30 a. m. Lieutenant Bright woke 
me, and I went out on the field. Every- 
thing looked encouraging. The fog was 
lifting, and it promised to be a bright 
and sunshiny day. Nothing could be 
better. It is true that the Reds could 
see better on a clear day, but our spirits 
were greatly improved by the fair wea- 
ther and our morale was excellent on 
a bright sunshiny day. It made me 
think of the beautiful day when my col- 
lege swamped its rival in baseball by the 
score of 16 to 1, and we almost had a 
real fight because they called us Free 
Silverites. 

At 4:30, the barrage started, and we 
followed it as in the last solution, with 
Companies B and C in skirmish line and 
the tanks waddling along with them. 
However, this time the line went for- 
ward without any deadly enfilade lire 
from the woods on our left. The men 
of Company D were right on the heels 
of the barrage, jumped across the creek 
the moment that the barrage passed and 



86 Booby's Bluffs 

smothered the machine guns. This was 
deadly work and many of my men were 
killed. The enemy machine guns were 
often some distance back from the creek 
and fired through lanes made in the 
trees. As a result, if they raised their 
heads after the barrage, they managed 
to get in some shots before the men from 
Company D could cross the creek and 
get them. Four machine guns were 
captured, but the rest got away. It was 
deadly work. But Company D, with 
fearful loss, cleaned them up so fast or 
kept them so busy that they could not 
disturb the rest of the line. As a result, 
the line moved forward with precision, 
just behind the barrage, and reached the 
objective. Company D, or what was left 
of it, came up and extended the line just 
on the east slope of hill 443, and we pro- 
ceeded to dig in and consolidate. I sent 
forward the engineers to consolidate the 
position. I had always heard that engi- 
neers should be on hand to consolidate a 
position, but I never knew just what this 
meant, and it appears that engineers 
themselves do not know. Obediently, 
they went forward and spread through 
the lines and gave a lot of advice, but 
in reality they joined in as infantry, and 
helped to hold the position. As this was 
what the engineer captain said he wanted 
I felt that I had done just right. The 



Fourth Solution 87 

tanks reported that they were stuck in 
the creek. I thought it was a good place 
to be stuck, so it was all right. 

Meanwhile, I told my signalman to 
send a message back to Colonel R. to 
the effect that we had taken our objec- 
tive, Booby's Creek, and were now con- 
solidating the position. As this had to 
be signalled, and then telephoned, it took 
some time. In fact, I did not expect any 
answer. I only wished to show the Old 
Man that I had succeeded, just as I had 
told him I would. I rather expected 
that he would send forward another bat- 
talion to relieve me at dark and I could 
then return to the reserve and reorganize 
my force, now somewhat cut up, though 
not at all seriously injured, as their 
losses had been only some 20 per cent. 

I directed Company A to dig squad 
trenches with large intervals in its re- 
serve position east of the small ridge 
through hill 407. Then I went forward 
to the front line to see what was to be 
seen. Our barrage started again, the 
20 minutes being up, and went on over 
the bluffs and valleys to the west of 
Booby's Creek. My accompanying guns 
had ceased firing, and the stokes mor- 
tars and machine guns either had ceased 
firing or were firing on targets not in 
my immediate vicinity. As the enemy 
seemed fairly quiet, I congratulated my- 



88 Booby's Bluffs 

self that I had won a hard fight, and 
that tomorrow would be another day, 
and possibly tomorrow another battalion 
would do the attacking. Meanwhile 
we had won enough glory for a while 
at least. 

My satisfaction was not lasting. My 
signalman handed me a message which 
he had received from Colonel R., some 
20 minutes after our barrage had started 
on its jaunt over the hills and valleys to 
the westward. This message was stern 
and to the point. It said : 

"You were given no objective period. 
You should not have stopped until the 
barrage stopped and not even then. 
Keep going. Hurry !" 

It thus appeared that I should now be 
following the barrage on its scenic tour ; 
and it was now 500 yards away and 
going strong. I gave commands and 
messages to hurry forward, but it was 
at least half an hour before we could 
get started, as everybody was busy dig- 
ging in. Some of them did not want to 
go, and some did not believe that I had 
given such an order as I had been so 
careful to have it explained to the last 
private that the creek bottom was our 
objective, and that we would stop there. 
Incidentally, they had laid aside their 
hand grenades and had to find them 
again. At last I got them started, and 



Fourth Solution 89 

they hurried forward to catch the bar- 
rage before it had lost itself in the Pa- 
cific ocean. My machine guns and stokes 
mortars did not help at all. I tried to 
send back a message to them, but was 
told by the signalman that, although the 
signalmen were on the job, yet they 
did not have any orderlies and could 
send messages only by telephone or by 
visual signals. However, they did catch 
the accompanying guns and told them to 
help. In fact, these two accompanying 
guns did the best they could, but with 
all due credit to them I must say that 
the barrage made by them was about 
as effective as nothing at all. Once or 
twice I thought I saw the burst of one 
of their shells, but I am not sure that 
it was not an enemy shell falling short. 
At any rate, off we started and pro- 
gressed beautifully until we reached the 
top of hill 442. My men passed over, 
and I reached the top of the hill in time 
to see the last flick of dust from our bar- 
rage disappear over the ridge some 900 
yards to the west. This was a little 
comfort; at least the barrage was not 
lost altogether, and by quick running we 
might catch it. I remembered that I 
had once run 100 yards in 10 seconds; 
therefore, my men should cover ground 
in twice that time, which would make 
them catch the barrage in a little over 



90 Booby's Bluffs 

9x10x2 seconds =180 seconds or 3 
minutes. 

Altogether I calculated that in 5 more 
minutes we would be as well off as ever, 
and my error would be compensated. 

But it was not to be. I saw my line 
of men some 200 yards ahead of me 
going at a run (as fast as they could run 
when loaded down with hand grenades) ; 
and then I saw the most awful destruc- 
tion that I ever witnessed. Machine 
guns, artillery, mortars, everything 
seemed to open up on that poor thin 
line, and it just naturally went out of 
business. Some few of the men reached 
the ravine at the foot of the hill and 
hid in the trees. Most of them fell. A 
very few ran back by me on the hilltop. 
It even seemed as if the enemy was vin- 
dictive, and they pursued the few who 
ran by me. Shells and bullets followed 
them and soon I was in the midst of the 
awful carnage. It was evident to me 
that the battle was over as far as I was 
concerned. I looked to the east and saw 
the Second Battalion coming at a double 
time, but it would take more than a 
battalion to capture that hilltop. Being 
a true sport to the last, I stuck to my 
post and with my glasses looked at the 
enemy position, so that I could tell the 
commander of the Second Battalion of 
what the position consisted. I saw wire 



Fourth Solution 91 

along the whole front ; I saw a few Reds 
standing on the hill making signals to 
the rear ; I saw a few new trenches here 
and there; and I thought I could locate 
a few concrete machine gun emplace- 
ments. It was evident to me that even 
if we had been right along with the bar- 
rage, we could never have struggled 
through that belt of wire and demolished 
those machine guns without the help of 
wire cutters, smoke and tanks. Yet, I 
had no organized wire cutters; the 
stokes mortars were not close enough to 
help with smoke, and the tanks were 
stuck in the creek bottom. It is true 
that there were some engineers scat- 
tered through my line fighting like in- 
fantry; but they were using their rifles, 
and they do not carry wire cutters ex- 
cept on special occasions. 

I saw that I had still much to learn 
about this war game. 

After my men had all streamed past 
me, I still stuck to my position on the 
hill. I determined that I would not 
leave, but would wait until the major 
of Second Battalion came up. Mean- 
while, I would learn all I could, and tell 
him on his arival. But even this was 
not to be. Very soon I heard the scream 
of a shell coming directly toward me, 
but I stood and did not flinch. It struck 
me, and tore away part of my shoulder 



92 Booby's Bluffs 

and then buried itself in the ground be- 
hind me. It did not even explode. I 
was killed by a "Dud." It flashed over 
my mind what my old college friends 
would say: "Yes, List, the man who 
made the winning touch-down in 1910 
was in the Battle of Booby's Bluff ; but 
he was killed by a 'Dud\" My life was 
ebbing away, and everything was becom- 
ing dark. Suddenly it occurred to me 
that I was alone, that no one would ever 
know that I was killed by a "Dud" ; so 
I felt comforted and actually smiled as 
I lapsed into unconsciousness — and 
woke up. 

My subconscious mind had done well. 
I knew several more lessons : 

16. The business of war is not a 
game. It is a science, and there are al- 
ways new ideas in the business. It can- 
not be partially learned in six weeks, 
and can never be entirely learned; al- 
ways one can learn something new 
about it. 

17. There should be no limited objec- 
tive in an attack; the barrage must be 
followed to its end, and then the cap- 
tured objective must be exploited as far 
as is possible with the troops remaining 
in the attacking force. 

18. There should always be a battalion 
headquarters, even if the major is not 
with it. This headquarters is preferably 



Fourth Solution 93 

at the head of the telephone line, and 
orderlies and messengers should be 
there to connect up with places not 
otherwise accessible. 

19. Engineers can fight, but are to be 
used for that purpose only when neces- 
sary. Front line engineers are to help 
forward the rest of the troops, especially 
tanks and artillery. 

20. Such jaunts as night patrols and 
aeroplane rides, must not be taken by 
commanding officers. No commanding 
officer is justified in unnecessary bra- 
very, as he may be killed, and many 
more will be killed because of his death. 
First: he should never risk himself; 
second: he should never risk his staff, 
unnecessarily. 



FIFTH SOLUTION 

AT 6 P. M. I was at Colonel R.'s 
headquarters, and we promptly 
went to work. Colonel R. was 
very anxious to see that I understood 
everything. This was the first time that 
I had seen the Colonel since my return 
from a course with G-5. I had always 
been impressed with the fact that the 
Colonel was a thorough student of the 
art of war, and my recent duty with 
the G-5 had shown me that he was 
much better than most of the other 
officers with whom I had become ac- 
quainted. However, I was again im- 
pressed with his thoroughness. He 
called my attention to several things, 
asked many questions, and brought out 
the lessons which are already listed as 
having been learned. Especially did 
Colonel R. tell me to be careful to put 
all of my assisting troops to the use 
for which they were best fitted. 

Finally, we went carefully over the 
minutes as shown by the artillery bar- 
rage lines, and I figured out just ex- 
actly the minute that the artillery would 
stop and again start at hill 442 and its 
north and south ridge. Although I was 
not in the artillery, I had always been 
impressed with those beautifully exact 
parallel lines which they always drew 
95 



96 Booby's Bluffs 

just 100 yards apart showing that the 
artillery barrage moved at the rate of 
100 yards in 4 minutes. 

At 6.30 a. m. the artillery would 
stop on hill 442 and its north and south 
ridge; at 6.50 a. m. it would go for- 
ward again. This gave me 20 minutes 
to get ready to go forward with the 
barrage. It was all beautiful and im- 
pressive. This time I questioned Colo- 
nel R. carefully as to just what was 
expected of my battalion; and he told 
me that he expected that I would take 
the bluff (hills 462 and 463) some 1,500 
yards west of Booby's Creek, that the 
barrage would then cease as shown by 
the fact that the beautiful parallel lines 
stopped there, and that I would then 
hold the position and exploit my suc- 
cess in so far as was possible in view 
of the condition of my battalion and 
of the comparative successes of the 
troops on my right and left. 

Colonel R. also said that I might ex- 
pect the 2d Battalion to be close up be- 
hind me at that time ; that it would have 
orders to do what he (Colonel R.) 
thought best in view of the existing 
situation as shown by my reports — but 
to be sure to send him reports. 

I returned to my farmhouse as in 
the other solutions, questioned Lieu- 
tenant Bright about the information 



Fifth Solution 97 

concerning the enemy, and received the 
same reply as before, viz., that the re- 
ports were very indefinite and that he 
could only say that it appeared that 
there was no enemy east of Booby's 
Creek. This information was not 
enough. I sent orders to the companies 
to send out patrols and bring back the 
desired information by 10 p. m. This 
was done, and I may state here that the 
information received was to the effect 
that there was surely no enemy east 
of Booby's Creek, but there were many 
Reds and some machine guns in the 
woods south of the bend. There was 
a Red line of sentinels on the west side 
of Booby's Creek and no patrol had 
been able to penetrate that line to de- 
termine whether it camouflaged a line 
of trenches or whether it was simply 
an outpost some thousand or more 
yards in front of their main line of 
resistance. 

All of this information was received 
by 10 p. m., at which time the captains 
and the officers of special assisting 
troops were present in accordance with 
orders as issued in the Fourth Solu- 
tion. This time, I knew a little more 
about the uses of the special assisting 
troops, and made my dispositions some- 
what differently, but generally in ac- 




98 Booby's Bluffs 

cordance with a plan which pleased 
them: 

(a) The signal detachment was or- 
dered to connect me with the accom- 
panying guns and also with Colonel R.'s 
headquarters as before; but this time, I 
decided to stay with them, making my 
headquarters with the detachment or 
rather making it a part of my head- 
quarters. If I left the headquarters, 
I would leave Lieutenant Swift (my ad- 
jutant) and half of the orderlies with 
it and would take with me several of its 
members so that I could wig-wag back 
messages to anyone, which messages 
would be delivered by telephone or by 
orderly with the least possible delay. 

(b) The engineers were given orders 
quite different from last time. Two pla- 
toons were detailed as wire cutters, to 
remain with the front line of the infan- 
try and cut wire for them where they 
could not get through. Two other pla- 
toons were to accompany the tanks, to 
get them across Booby's Creek. For 
this purpose, they were to prepare cer- 
tain fascines or logs which they would 
place on the tanks to carry forward with 
them and throw across the creek when 
they arrived there, so that the tanks 
would not get stuck in the creek. 

(c) The two accompanying guns 
seemed to be all right, and their com- 



Fifth Solution 99 

mander claimed that he would keep up 
with me. I gave them the same orders 
as in the last solution. 

(d) The stokes mortar man happened 
to mention that he had smoke and I 
at once decided that he would be able 
to blanket the machine guns on our left 
until the infantry could reach them; 
thereby many lives would be saved. I 
ordered them to put down smoke just 
as per the artillery barrage, taking po- 
sition for that purpose in the cut just 
southeast of road crossing 420. 

(e) The machine guns were given 
the same orders as before, viz., to watch 
me and keep their fire ahead of me. 

(/) The tanks were told to keep in 
line with the infantry. On no account 
were they to get ahead of the infantry, 
nor were they to fall behind the in- 
fantry. 1 

I then gave Captains B. and C. the 
same orders as in Fourth Solution. 
They would cover the front, north of 
the creek. They would spread out their 
skirmishers so as to cover the whole 
front except where Company D would 
be ; Company D was given the same or- 
ders — to clear out the machine guns in 
the woods. Company C was the bat- 
talion reserve. 



^rder actually given to a tank organization 
in one of our largest battles in France. 



100 Booby's Bluffs 

The whole plan was gone over very 
carefully, and I explained to all that 
we had no limited objective, that we 
would follow the barrage to the bluff 
(hill 462-hill 463), where the barrage 
would cease. But that did not mean 
that we would stop. Our further ac- 
tions at that time would depend on 
our condition and on the relative suc- 
cesses of the troops to our right and 
left. 

After everyone had gone over the 
whole plan and had asked all possible 
questions, I dismissed them, and went 
to sleep confident that we would the 
next day take the position and enforce 
our will upon the enemy. 

At 3.30 a. m., the signal corps man on 
duty waked us all up, and we went out 
on the field. I had previously decided 
that I would view the battle from hill 
441, where the machine guns were lo- 
cated, and during the night the signal 
detachment had installed a telephone 
on the eastern slope. Also, some of 
the engineers had built me a small com- 
mand post, nothing but a hole in the 
ground with a raised parapet carefully 
camouflaged, but so arranged that I 
could sweep the whole front with my 
field glasses. Everything was ready for 
the jump-off. 

At 4.30 the barrage started, and off 






Fifth Solution 101 

we went. As before, the enemy's coun- 
ter barrage came down, but my men 
knew how to get by it, so there were 
very few casualties. Company D, aided 
by the smoke of the Stokes mortars, 
made short work of cleaning out the 
machine guns in the woods south of 
the bend in Booby's Creek, with very 
little loss to itself. 

It was a small job when properly 
handled, because there were only four 
Red machine guns in the woods. It was 
really only a small outpost. 

Companies B and C followed the 
barrage with very little loss, and when 
the barrage halted for its 20 minutes on 
the north and south ridge through hill 
442, Companies B and C in the creek 
bottom and Company D on hill 443 re- 
formed and prepared for the farther 
advance. So far, everything had gone 
beautifully, and I sent a message back 
to Colonel R. to the effect that we were 
right up with the barrage, had just 
crossed the creek, and would go forward 
in fine shape; few losses so far. 

Nothing had gone wrong, but I could 
not help feeling that this artillery bar- 
rage had been wasted so far. Every one 
knew that there was no enemy of im- 
portance east of the creek; yet this 
barrage had wasted thousands of rounds 



102 Booby's Bluffs 

of ammunition before we had reached 
the enemy front line of resistance. 

I suppose that the man who drew 
those beautiful straight lines had started 
on the right some miles to the north 
where the enemy front line was due 
north of hill 442, and had just drawn 
his beautiful straight line due north 
and south, and then made the others 
parallel to it. I began to feel an aversion 
for beautiful straight lines, and in fact 
for parallel lines of any kind and for 
barrage lines in particular. I knew that 
I would soon want all of that ammuni- 
tion which had been thrown into the 
straight line spaces; and I could see 
no reason why the barrage should put 
just as much ammunition on an unoc- 
cupied field as it did on an enemy front 
line. 

I would have much preferred that at 
least 99 per cent of this ammunition 
had been thrown on the enemy's lines 
which we were soon to tackle and 
which so far had not received a single 
shot. 

It appeared evident to me that I 
should move my command post to hill 
443, as from that hill I could see the 
Red position some 1,000 yards to the 
west. Preferably, I would have placed 
my new command post on hill 442, but 
unfortunately it was included in those 



Fifth Solution 103 

beautiful parallel barrage lines and I 
was barred from it for twenty minutes ; 
so I had to go to hill 443 which was 
nearly as good. I told the signal 
corps man to put a telephone as 
quickly as possible on hill 443 for me. 
Then, after telling Lieutenant Swift 
to take charge of the command post 
until the new telephone was estab- 
lsihed, I took two of the signal men 
with their flags and heliograph, and 
ran forward to hill 443. 

By quick running, I got there with 
some 5 minutes to spare before the bar- 
rage would start again. I saw Captain 
D. on the hill top, his company being 
just east of the ridge, where the enemy 
could not see it. He pointed out to 
me the general line of the Red trenches 
and he showed positions where he sup- 
posed there were machine guns. This 
was rendered more probable because he 
had seen sudden spurts of dust followed 
some few seconds later by the rat-tat-tat 
of machine gun fire. 

Off to the south we could see the 
line of the neighboring Blues extend- 
ing our line over hill 446 and beyond. 

Off to the north we could not see 
any line of Blues, but heard firing off 
to the northeast in the direction of 
Four Points and Martin's Mill. From 
this we judged that the Blues on our 



104 Booby's Bluffs 

north had been unable to keep up with 
the barrage, and that after we cap- 
tured the Red position we would have 
to swing to the north and drive them 
away from the front of the Blues on 
our right. This seemed easy, as the 
ridge from hill 462 sloped to the north- 
east. Once we had hill 462, all of the 
Reds to the northeast would have to 
retreat or surrender. Captain D. also 
pointed out to me the lines of wire in 
front of the Red main line of resist- 
ance and 1 felt especially glad that I 
had decided to use half of my engi- 
neers as wire cutters instead of leaving 
them behind to guard the artillery or 
to fool around with bridges. 

I was a little worried for fear that 
the tanks had not been able to get 
across the creek, but a glance to the 
north showed the noses of not less 
than eight tanks just in the edge of 
the woods on the west bank of the 
creek, so I felt sure that they were all 
across. 

The telephone man was coming up 
on the run, stringing his wire as he 
came, but he could not make it before 
the barrage started again. However, 
I felt that there was plenty of time; 
it would be at least 18 minutes before 
the barrage actually struck the Red 



Fifth Solution 105 

line of trenches, and I could make all 
necessary dispositions in that time. 

I studied the situation carefully and 
decided that I had made every possible 
arrangement, except as follows : 

1. The two accompanying guns 
should concentrate their fire on the 
woods 350 yards southeast of hill 462, 
as it was evident that there were many 
enemy machine guns in those woods. 

2. The machine guns should come 
forward and concentrate their fire on 
these same woods. 

3. The Stokes mortars should cover 
the Red position with smoke. 

4. On our right the Reds could en- 
filade us from the top of the ridge run- 
ning northeast of hill 462. But this 
was out of my sector, and it was up to 
the man on my right. It so happened 
that he was not on my right (he was 
away behind), but it was not my fault 
if he had not kept up. He was re- 
sponsible and he would suffer if any- 
thing went wrong. 

It took me practically no time to make 
my decisions on these points, and I 
hurried to telephone to Lieutenant 
Swift, so that he could personally make 
all of the arrangements before he left 
the former command post. Luckily, I 
caught him just as he was leaving to 
join me, and told him to see the Stokes 



106 Booby's Bluffs 

mortars and machine guns, and to have 
me connected with the two accompany- 
ing guns. The results were not at all 
satisfactory. It took me some 15 min- 
utes of telephoning to the accompany- 
ing guns and of sending messages back 
and forth by Lieutenant Swift to the 
machine guns and Stokes mortars be- 
fore I finally got the matters fixed, and 
even then they were not fixed to my 
satisfaction. I shall consider them in 
order. 

1. The commander of the accompany- 
ing guns said that he had accompanied 
me up to date by fire ; that accompanying 
guns were not supposed to accompany 
by anything but fire ; that he w r ould lose 
too many trained artillerymen. I told 
him that was all right. He would con- 
tinue to accompany me by fire, and 
that I wanted the fire on those woods 
350 yards southeast of hill 462. This 
did not suit him at all. He said that 
he woud have to put an observation post 
where the observer could see the woods 
and observe his registration shots. On 
being pinned down, I learned that he 
could get this all rigged up properly, 
make his registration shots, and begin 
shooting in some 40 minutes. This 
would be after the position had been 
taken or lost, so I tried to get him on 
some other scheme. He said that the 



Fifth Solution 107 

next best thing was for him to help by 
map firing, but that he would probably 
miss the target by some 100 yards. I 
told him then to map fire at hill 463, 
as my men were going to take hill 462, 
and if he would miss the woods by 100 
yards, I would prefer to have him try 
his hand on some point where I knew 
the enemy was and where I knew my 
men would not be for some 30 minutes. 
He was to stop his map firing at ex- 
actly the time I prescribed, and that I 
would telephone him. 

2. Lieutenant Swift ran over to see 
the machine gun commander, and told 
him I wanted him to move forward to 
hill 443 and help in the attack. To his 
surprise, Lieutenant Swift was told by 
the captain of the machine gun com- 
pany that he had orders not to move 
forward; that his orders were to fire a 
barrage and then answer all calls for 
help; that he had been so instructed 
time and again by his machine gun bat- 
talion. commander. 1 There was con- 
siderable argument on the part of Lieut- 
enant Swift, but no results, so he re- 
turned and telephoned me. I did not 
waste time on the argument, but told 
Lieutenant Swift to tell him to answer 
my call for help, that I called for help 

x An actual occurrence in the battle of 
Meuse-Argonne. 



108 Booby's Bluffs 

by machine gun fire on the woods 350 
yards southeast of hill 462. This mes- 
sage was taken over by Lieutenant 
Swift, but the result was again unsatis- 
factory. It appeared that hill 462 was 
just beyond the effective range of ma- 
chine guns, and that the accuracy could 
not be trusted, consequently I decided 
to tell him not to fire. 

3. With the Stokes mortars, Lieuten- 
ant Swift ran up against a very different 
kind of difficulty. He asked for smoke. 
The lieutenant in charge told him that 
all of the smoke shells had been ex- 
pended in the work against the woods 
south of the bend to help Company D. 
He made a calculation, thus : 80 smoke 
shells per gun; each shell some 20 sq. 
yards; 2 guns; 2X20X80=3,200 sq. 
yards, which was a little more than the 
area covered, but he had thrown in 
some extra ones in order to surely make 
the smoke effective. I had to acknowl- 
edge that it was effective, but I needed 
smoke again. However, there was no 
smoke. Therefore, I called for just 
plain explosive on the woods 350 yards 
southeast of hill 462. The Stokes mor- 
tar man expressed great regrets to Lieu- 
tenant Swift, but he scaled off the dis- 
tance on the map and showed that it 
was some 2,800 yards, whereas the ex- 
treme effective range of Stokes mortars 



Fifth Solution 109 

is only 1,800 yards so we could not get 
the explosive shell. However, the Stokes 
mortar man showed a great willingness 
and anxiety to help. He started at once 
to move his mortars forward, and told 
Lieutenant Swift to assure me that in 
half an hour he would have his Stokes 
mortars in the creek just southeast of 
hill 443 and would then shell the woods 
in question. This was much too late, 
as the barrage was even now approach- 
ing the woods, and in a few minutes 
the battle would be lost or won. 

I was powerless to assist my advanc- 
ing line. The assisting artillery, machine 
guns and mortars were useless. But I 
could at least tell Colonel R. the situa- 
tion. So, I telephoned him about the 
machine guns and the accompanying 
guns. He was very angry and sent a 
peremptory message to the machine gun 
commander to do at once anything or- 
dered, but it was too late to save the 
situation. As usual, the poor infantry- 
man was left alone, with a few engineers 
and tanks, and had to fight it out. I 
could do nothing more except pray for 
the effectiveness of the barrage, with its 
beautiful parallel lines. 

Meanwhile, my line of men and tanks 
had crossed hill 442 and its north and 
south ridge, followed the barrage down 
its slope, and were now beginning to 



110 Booby's Bluffs 

ascend on the other side. To my sur- 
prise, the barrage was not as effective 
as I had been led to expect. It was 
evidently encouraging to the men; but 
it certainly did not entirely stop the 
fire of the Reds. By this, I mean not 
only the fire of the Red artillery some 
distance to the rear (which the barrage 
was not expected to touch) but also 
the fire of the Red machine guns in 
the Red line (which the barrage was 
expected to stop). 

As I looked at my line, I saw that 
three of the tanks had been hit and 
stopped; the rest had crossed the bot- 
tom of the ravine and were ascending 
the slope, with my men abreast of them, 
a perfect target, but at least alongside 
of the tanks and ready to prevent them 
being blown up by special Red detach- 
ments. Every few seconds I would 
see a shell miss a tank and blow up 
some 8 or 10 men who were alongside. 

It was deadly. Every shell that 
missed the tanks, hit the men along- 
side. But the shells were the least cause 
of the carnage. The Red machine guns 
in the Red concrete turrets (pill boxes) 
in front of us seemed to have no fear 
of a barrage at all. 

From my position I could see the 
exact sweep of a machine gun, as man 
after man fell in order from right to 



Fifth Solution 111 

left. First, the gun would sweep from 
north to south, and the men would fall 
from south to north. It took about four 
sweeps to practically extinguish a line. 
Then the machine gun would switch to 
the interval between the next two tanks 
and again execute its sweeping. 

Still, we were holding our own on 
the whole front, or at least we were 
following the barrage on our whole 
front, and on the right the machine 
guns seemed to be less effective. I 
had hopes that we would at least cap- 
ture hill 462 and hold it until relief 
came. Lieutenant Swift rushed up to 
me with the information that the opera- 
tor at our former command post said 
that the 2nd Battalion was coming for- 
ward at a double time. I felt that at 
least I would not have failed, if my 
right captured hill 462, and even then 
the wire cutters were in front of it 
cutting the wires. I saw the brave line 
of following men go forward and lie 
down while the wire was being cut. 
Many of the cutters were hit and could 
not go forward. Suddenly the line rose 
again, what was left of it, and started 
forward through the wire. I felt that 
hill 462 was surely won, and I was 
thankful that at least we had broken 
the Red line in one place and they 
would have to retire. However, I was 



112 Booby's Bluffs 

a little in error, some 50 yards in fact. 
For, just as my men began to run 
through the cut wire, Red machine guns 
opened on them from the ridge to the 
northeast of hill 462 (from the sector 
of the Blues on my right), and my men 
just ceased to exist. Some few threw 
up their hands, and walked forward as 
prisoners. The remainder fell, to rise 
no more. 

I turned to telephone the result to 
Colonel R. I felt proud of my men, 
and I felt that I had made very few 
mistakes. I rang and rang and rang 
the bell, but could get no reply. The 
line was out. As a little touch of irony, 
I noticed that the two accompanying 
guns were firing on hill 463, with orders 
to continue firing until I told them to 
stop. The telephone wire was broken, 
and I could not tell them to stop. I did 
not care. I hoped that they would con- 
tinue to fire until doomsday. I smiled 

at this, the final touch and woke 

up. 

By this time, my subconscious mind 
seemed to have about worked out a 
solution. The last effort on its part 
had been a good one, and I felt that I 
had at least made a good fight, but lost. 
I had learned some more things : 

LESSONS 

21. Know something about the ranges 



Fifth Solution 113 

and ammunition of the Stokes mortars. 
If you want an extra amount of smoke, 
arrange for an extra quantity of smoke 
shells. 

22. Make your accompanying guns 
really accompany. This does not mean 
that they shall follow your tracks like 
a dog, but it does mean that they shall 
always have with the forward element 
an observer connected with the guns, 
who shall direct their fire always and 
quickly just where you tell them. In 
some cases the guns themselves should 
be on the front line, no matter how 
great their losses in trained artillerymen. 

23. Tanks should precede the infantry 
firing line, and demolish the machine 
gun nests. The tanks should protect 
the infantry against machine guns. It 
is not the duty of infantry to protect 
tanks against some prowling enemy with 
a few dynamite cartridges. 

24. Machine guns, Stokes mortars, 
accompanying guns, etc., should all be 
directly under the command of the com- 
manding officer. If not, he should have 
nothing to do with them except to learn 
what they may do. He should not ex- 
pect them to do more than one thing; 
after that is done, he will have to win 
the battle, possibly with their help ; but 
he should plan to win without such 
help, as it is rarely forthcoming. 



114 Booby's Bluffs 

25. Connecting groups shall fill the 
space between two adjacent units. 
These groups are preferably sent out 
by the higher commanders, but if not 
thus sent out, the commander of the 
assaulting groups will send out some 
of his own. It is an excuse to be able 
to say that the higher commanders did 
not send out the connecting groups; 
but saying so does not prevent enfilade 
on the enemy's part and does not bring 
the dead to life. 

26. A small amount of artillery bar- 
rage will keep up the courage of the 
attacking line. Beyond that, shells are 
wasted which have no definite aim. A 
perfect attack would consist of a light 
barrage behind which the troops would 
follow, accompanied by strong concen- 
trations against points which are known 
or properly believed to be held by the 
enemy. The line of greatest concen- 
tration would be just the reverse of 
parallel and straight. It would resemble 
a corkscrew. The probable strong posi- 
tions of the enemy should be selected 
beforehand and the artillery should be 
concentrated on these places just before 
the barrage (or infantry line) reaches 
them. 

27. The assault commander should 
have as many guns directly under his 
command as he can possibly use. He 



Fifth Solution 115 

should not be allowed to control the 
stopping or starting of the barrage, but 
he should be able to control at least in 
part the corkscrew line of greatest con- 
centration of guns. In some cases, the 
barrage line may be omitted altogether. 
28. In spite of all barrages and con- 
centrations of artillery fire, the enemy 
machine guns sheltered by concrete tur- 
rets (pill-boxes) will not be at all af- 
fected unless directly hit. In the final 
analysis, the tank must smash them 
or the infantryman must take them. 



AN APPROVED SOLUTION 

AT 6 p. m. I was at the meeting 
of field and staff officers at 
Colonel R's headquarters. This 
time I decided to study the proposition 
while at his headquarters and not wait 
until I returned to my farmhouse. 
Colonel R was very anxious to assist 
all of us, and he told me that he would 
explain anything that did not seem per- 
fectly clear to me. 

I promptly saw that my battalion was 
going to have the hardest nut to crack. 
In fact, it was to follow the barrage to 
its stopping point — the bluffs of hill 
462 hill 463 — and then what was left of 
my battalion would naturally be ex- 
pected to exploit the success or just hold 
its own, depending upon whether it was 
in any kind of shape or only just able 
to hold on. 

With all due respect to Colonel R, I 
decided that I would see that nothing 
had been forgotten and that nothing 
could be improved by any suggestion of 
mine. I had always made it a rule to 
see that my senior officer understood 
perfectly my own information or con- 
clusions as regards anything about 
which I had any dealings with him; 
then, no matter what he decided, I would 
do my utmost to carry it to a successful 
conclusion. On several occasions I had 

117 



118 Booby's Bluffs 

met with commanders who, either 
through ignorance or a lack of under- 
standing of the best method of getting 
results, would not listen to a suggestion 
and who always acted as if any sugges- 
tion was a criticism of their intelligence. 
With such commanders, it is a mistake 
to be associated, and I had always man- 
aged to sever my connection with them 
and their operations in a very short 
time. As a result, I now enjoyed a rep- 
utation of being an officer who said 
what he thought, but who always got 
results. In this case, I hoped to main- 
tain this reputation of getting results, 
and I felt that I stood an excellent 
chance, because Colonel R was an un- 
usual regimental commander in that he 
was patient and intelligent and very 
anxious to do everything possible to 
assist his subordinates to obtain the de- 
sired results. 

First, I invited his attention to the 
beautiful system of parallel barrage 
lines. It did not suit me, as I felt that 
most of the ammunition would be 
wasted in unoccupied fields, but Colonel 
R said that this was an established sys- 
tem which had survived many criti- 
cisms ; that it encouraged the men who 
followed it; that he tried to get it 
changed, as he wished to cencentrate 
more fire on special places, but had been 



An Approved Solution 119 

unable to do so. However, he called 
my attention to the two accompanying 
guns, said that I could see that their 
fire was concentrated on any point that 
I wished. I told him that the concen- 
trated fire of two accompanying guns 
would not be very effective, and asked 
him to get me more. He telephoned to 
the brigade headquarters, and after a 
little time, word was received that we 
could have two more accompanying 
guns, a total of four. This helped a 
great deal. 

Then I asked Colonel R exactly what 
were the orders of the machine gun 
company which was to assist me. He 
said that it was to assist me, and that 
he considered that it was a matter en- 
tirely in my own hands. I agreed with 
him that it should be entirely in my own 
hands, but I mentioned a few cases in 
various battles in Europe where the 
commander of the assisting machine 
guns was of the opinion, and was so 
ordered by his machine gun commander, 
that he was to assist in his own manner 
and not in my manner. So we called 
in the machine gun battalion commander 
and he was given orders to have his 
machine gun company placed entirely at 
my disposal, to be used in any manner 
I saw fit, much to the chagrin of the 
machine gun battalion commander. 

More tanks were needed, and I tried 



120 Booby's Bluffs 

to get them. Colonel R said that he 
had no more to give me, and I could not 
make him see it differently. 

When it came to light mortars, I 
wanted them all, and I soon convinced 
Colonel R that I could use them better 
than anyone else. However, he was 
loth to let them go entirely out of his 
hands. So it was finally arranged that 
I should have two sections entirely at my 
own disposal, and that the third section 
would fire smoke into the woods south 
of the bend in Booby's Creek, but would 
pass back to Colonel R's direct com- 
mand as soon as I advanced beyond 
these woods. I asked for and received 
double the usual amount of smoke shell, 
as one of my lessons had taught me that 
smoke is very necessary in an open 
assault. 

Also, I managed to secure a Pioneer 
platoon of the headquarters company, 
to act as wire cutters. I tried to get 
some non-persistent gas for the woods 
south of the bend, but Colonel R said 
that the regiment had no gas troops 
whatever at its disposal. 

As a result of these final changes in 
orders I now had at my disposal : 

1 signal detachment 

1 company of engineers 

4 artillery accompanying guns 

2 light mortar sections (third section 
temporarily) 



An Approved Solution 121 

1 machine gun company 

2 platoons tanks 

Remembering now that enfilading 
was very possible from either of my 
flanks, if I got ahead of the troops on 
either flank, I asked Colonel R what pro- 
visions had been made for connecting 
groups. He said that no provisions had 
been made ; that the brigade commander 
thought this could be mutually arranged 
between the battalion commanders on 
the field. I called Colonel R's attention 
to the fact that the battalion on our 
right was commanded by old Major 
Grouch, and that no one had ever made 
any mutual arrangement with him ; that 
he did not understand any such thing 
as mutual arrangements; that the only 
thing he understood was a clear and dis- 
tinct order. Seeing that Colonel R was 
not averse to listening to me, I spread 
myself on this point. I told him that 
this business of mutual arrangement on 
the field never had worked; that it was 
only a dodge employed by a senior com- 
mander to avoid unnecessary detail or 
to pass on to the men in the field a prob- 
lem with which the commander felt 
himself unable to cope, owing to natural 
inability or to lack of information, and 
in neither case was he doing his full 
duty. Colonel R finally agreed to take 
up the matter again with the brigade 



122 Booby's Bluffs 

commander, and promised me that if 
the brigade commander would not issue 
the necessary order for the connecting 
groups, he would himself provide the 
necessary groups from his two remain- 
ing battalions in order to be sure that my 
line was not enfiladed. Everything be- 
ing arranged as well as I could expect, 
I left Colonel R with his final admoni- 
tion ringing in my ears : "Keep connect- 
ed with headquarters, and send me re- 
ports." 

On my return to my farmhouse I 
sent for all of the captains and for the 
commanders of the special troops to 
meet me at 10.00 p. m. Meanwhile, as 
Lieutenant Bright said that the infor- 
mation of the enemy was not very defi- 
nite, I ordered special patrols sent out 
along the front, each patrol being or- 
dered to go in a general westwardly 
direction until it encountered the Reds. 
Two special patrols were sent to find out 
if the Reds were occupying the woods 
in the bend south of the creek, and if 
so with what arms and in what strength. 
The reports came back as in the previous 
solution, being definite and clear, to the 
effect that Red sentinels were all along 
the west bank of Booby's Creek, either 
as outposts or hiding in an intrenched 
line; that the Red machine guns were 



An Approved Solution 123 

occupying the south bank of the bend 
in Booby's Creek. 

At 10.00 p. m. the officers were as- 
sembled, and I gave my orders somewhat 
as in the Fifth Solution, with some 
changes especially as to light mortars, 
accompanying guns, and machine guns. 
This time I did not ask them what 
pleased them, but assigned them to 
duties in accordance with my own ideas. 
I give below the orders in a general way, 
so that the complete plan will be evi- 
dent: 

(a) The signal detachment was ordered 
to connect me with the accompanying 
guns and also with Colonel R's head- 
quarters. As in Fifth Solution, I de- 
cided to stay with the signal detachment, 
making my headquarters with it, or 
rather making it a part of my head- 
quarters. If I left the headquarters I 
would leave Lieutenant Swift (my ad- 
jutant) and half of the orderlies with 
it, and would take with me several of 
the members so that I could wig-wag 
back messages to any one, which mes- 
sages would be delivered by telephone or 
by orderly with the least possible delay. 
(b) Two platoons of engineers were 
detailed to accompany the tanks and 
help them across the creek by improvised 
logs or fascines. Two other platoons 
were detailed to assist the infantry front 



124 Booby's Bluffs 

line as wire cutters, supplementing the 
wire cutters of the pioneer platoon. 

(c) The four accompanying guns 
were placed in their position in the ra- 
vine as before, but this time they were 
ordered to shoot on fixed targets ; and / 
gave them the targets, viz., the woods 
south of the bend along with the barrage 
until it made its twenty-minute stop; 
thereafter, the woods 350 yards south- 
east of hill 462 until I gave orders to the 
contrary. Always the accompanying 
guns would have an agent with me to 
send them word in case I wanted these 
targets changed at any time. 

(d) One of the light mortar sections 
was given exactly the same orders as in 
last solution, viz, to take position in the 
cut just southeast of road crossing 420, 
and to blanket with smoke the machine 
guns in the woods south of the bend. 
The two remaining sections were told to 
remain east of hill 441 until the woods 
south of the bend had been cleared, or 
at least partially cleared, and until the 
Blues on our left had advanced enough 
to- render their movement fairly safe; 
then they were to move forward as fast 
as reasonable safety permitted to a po- 
siton in the woods southeast of hill 443 
and prepare to fire on the ridge 1200 
yards to the west with smoke or high 
explosive as I should order. The first 



An Approved Solution 125 

section, when its work of firing on the 
woods had been completed with success, 
would remain in its position subject to 
the direct orders of Colonel R. 

(e) The machine guns were told to 
take position on hill 441 as before, but 
they were told to send half of their guns 
forward at the same time and in the 
same degree of safety as the light mor- 
tars, the rest of their guns to come for- 
ward similarly through the woods as 
soon as the barrage had stopped for its 
twenty-minute play on hill 442 and its 
corresponding ridge. 

(/) The tanks were told to keep some 
fifty yards ahead of the infantry, which 
actually meant that the nose of each 
tank would be in the back of our bar- 
rage and would receive shell splinters. 
This would do no damage and was to 
be expected. The tanks were specially 
instructed to watch out for machine gun 
nests and concrete turrets (pill boxes), 
and their special duty was to sit upon 
these at the first opportunity and mash 
them out of existence. In other words, 
the tanks were to help the infantry, and 
not serve to draw the enemy fire to 
themselves and the infantry. 

(g) The pioneer platoon was detailed 
as wire cutters to go along with the in- 
fantry. These, added to the engineer 
wire cutters, made me now have about 



126 Booby's Bluffs 

one squad of wire cutters to each pla- 
toon of infantry. 

I then gave Captains B and C orders 
to cover all of the front from the right 
to the bend in the creek where Company 
D would be, and that this would be cov- 
ered with skirmishers at any interval 
they found necessary. Company D was 
given the orders to clear out the ma- 
chine guns in the woods south of the 
bend in the creek. Company A was the 
battalion reserve. 

Every one was encouraged to ask 
questions, and the whole plan was gone 
over time after time until each under- 
stood the part he was to perform and 
the part that the other was to perform to 
assist him. I told Captain B that 
Colonel R would have a connecting 
group over on our right, and I told 
Captain D that he would likewise find 
that Colonel R had a connecting group 
on our left. I called the special atten- 
tion of all to the fact that we would 
follow the barrage to the bluff, hill 
462 — hill 463, where the barrage would 
cease; but that we would take the hill, 
and then exploit our success in the best 
possible manner. It was now about 
11.45 p.m. and, as all seemed to 
thoroughly understand the whole plan, 
they were dismissed. 

At 3.30 a.m. the signal corps man 



An Approved Solution 127 

woke us up, and we went to our new 
command post on hill 441, where the 
signal detachment had installed a tele- 
phone during the night, and where the 
pioneer platoon had built me a regular 
command post according to the book, 
with a lookout thoroughly camouflaged 
and splinter proof. I took my position 
and waited anxiously for 4.30 a. m. to 
come and for the fight to begin. 

Even the slowest time eventually 
passes, so finally 4.30 a. m. came and 
with it our barrage. I shall not go into 
great detail as to how every little mat- 
ter was attended to by my men, but suf- 
fice it to say that Company D very 
quickly cleaned up the woods south of 
the bend in the creek, capturing the four 
enemy machine guns with practically no 
loss. Companies B and C followed the 
barrage closely, Company D fell in on 
the left, and all arrived on time at the 
creek bottom and my line lay in position 
along the creek bottom and the east face 
of hill 443, while the artillery barrage 
played its rain of lead for twenty min- 
utes on hill 442 and the ridge to the 
south, where there were no Reds. 

At the earliest possible moment I 
moved to hill 443, taking with me some 
signal corps men with wig-wag and helio, 
leaving Lieutenant Swift to hold the 
old command past until the telephone 



128 Booby's Bluffs 

man could connect me up with a tele- 
phone on hill 443. This he at once 
started out to do, but had not quite ar- 
rived when the twenty minutes was up, 
and the artillery barrage again started 
on its tour of the country. 

My line quickly rose and followed the 
barrage and encountered a perfect storm 
of lead as soon as it crossed hill 442 and 
ridge to south of it. However, in a very 
few minutes, and just as I had ordered, 
the four light mortars put smoke all 
along the ridge to the west in a thor- 
oughly business-like manner and the 
Red shooting became very inaccurate. 
It is true that the smoke screen was 
never entirely effective, because the 
wind was continually blowing it away, 
but it was very useful. The tanks wad- 
dled forward and disappeared into the 
smoke and soon my men were swallowed 
up in it. The wind was unfortunately 
blowing a little in our direction, and it 
was impossible to keep their location 
covered with smoke; but the light mor- 
tars kept at it and managed to keep the 
front slope of the Red position covered 
by smoke so that only the top of the 
bluff was visible through it. 

I now issued orders to the accom- 
panying guns to switch to hill 463, as I 
could not be sure how far my men had 
advanced in the smoke and just when 



An Approved Solution 129 

they would come forward into our own 
fire. The machine guns were also 
brought up out of the woods near the 
light mortars and told to concentrate 
direct fire on hill 463. The light mor- 
tars were told to raise their fire so as 
to clear bluff hill 462— hill 463, and fire 
upon its reverse slope, but this time they 
were to use high explosive, as I wished 
to prevent any Reds coming up to coun- 
ter-attack my men when they took the 
position. 

Off to the south I noticed that the 
neighboring Blues were well up and 
were following the barrage closely; 
therefore I felt safe for that flank. Off 
to the north it was not so favorable. 
Major Grouch's men could not be seen, 
but I noticed shells bursting near Four 
Points and Martin's Mill; so I judged 
that he had lost the barrage and would 
not catch up. Therefore I saw that my 
right was subject to enfilade as soon as 
the smoke cleared. I looked in vain for 
the connecting group, but I did not 
really expect to see it, as it was neces- 
sarily small. Just then the telephone 
rang, and Lieutenant Swift reported 
from my old command post that a mes- 
sage had been received from the con- 
necting group that it was at the ravine 
junction of Booby's Creek 425 yards 
west of hill 407 ; that it had uncovered 



130 Booby's Bluffs 

several Red machine guns on the ridge 
running northeast from hill 462, and 
that it could go no farther. I saw that, 
while I was really winning, my right 
was in a rather precarious situation, and 
it might at any moment be enfiladed by 
machine guns, all due to the failure of 
Major Grouch to do his part. How- 
ever, there was no help for it and I must 
travel alone. I promptly ordered Com- 
pany A, which was now in reserve in 
the creek bottom just east of hill 442, 
to go straight over the ridge to the 
northwest, cross the ravine and capture 
and hold the ridge extending northeast 
from hill 462. This was my last re- 
serve, and if the enemy counter-attacked 
in force I was helpless and ruined. 
However, I felt that there was nothing 
else to do; the reserve is for use, not 
for treasure. Even so, I decided that 
Colonel R should now send forward the 
2nd Battalion; so I tlephoned him, ex- 
plaining the situation, , and stating that 
I had no reserve left, and requesting 
that he send forward the 2nd Battalion 
at once. He replied that the 2nd Bat- 
talion was already on its way and was 
even now at road crossing 420; and 
that he would send its major orders to 
report to me. With a great sigh of re- 
lief I turned to the front, thoroughly 
satisfied that I would now win the ridge. 



An Approved Solution 131 

As I looked, I saw the barrage emerge 
from the smoke, top hills 462 and 463, 
and start over to the far side. Here it 
again held its position, this time for 
some thirty minutes. I suddenly re- 
membered that Colonel R's order said 
that it would hold its final position for 
thirty minutes ; and I saw that all of my 
light mortar high explosive had been 
more or less wasted. However, it did 
no harm and possibly may have driven 
back some reserves who might have 
reached the hilltops before our barrage 
reached its final objective. In less than 
two minutes afterward I saw the tanks 
slowly waddling out of the smoke, 
breaking through the wire and roving 
up and down the Red trenches. Next I 
saw my infantry line stop and lie down 
in front of the wire, except where a few 
men followed through after the tanks; 
the wire cutters started their work and 
many of them did not finish. Then the 
line rose, charged through the wire and 
fell upon the Red position. It was cap- 
tured. I ordered the machine guns and 
accompanying guns to stop firing, and 
turned to telephone Colonel R that we 
had won the Red position. However, I 
was a little premature in my announce- 
ment. Just at this moment the Red 
machine guns over in Major Grouch's 
sector opened up on my line and enfi- 



132 Booby's Bluffs 

laded it with deadly effect. My men 
promptly lay down, and many of them 
began to run back to the cover of the 
smoke. The rat-tat- tat of the Red ma- 
chine guns continued without intermis- 
sion and I saw that I could not hold the 
line even after its capture unless those 
machine guns were stopped. I looked 
anxiously to the north, but the bursting 
shells at Four Points showed that Ma- 
jor Grouch's men were still fighting at 
that place, 1000 yards away from where 
they should have been in order to help 
us properly. I pinned my faith then on 
Company A, and I was not disappointed. 
In less than one minute after the ma- 
chine guns opened, I heard wild yells 
from that direction and some rifle shots ; 
and then the Red machine guns stopped 
firing. Company A had taken the ridge 
and the machine guns. 

The exploitation of our victory was 
a matter not so easily decided. I saw 
the 2nd Battalion coming on over the 
ridge from which I had started. I did 
not know what to do ; whether to have it 
swing to our right in order to clear up 
the Red line, or whether to have it fol- 
low directly west after the fleeing Reds. 
I seized the telephone and asked for 
Colonel R himself. He decided for me, 
with a broader vision than I had. He 
decided for the greatest results, with no 



An Approved Solution 133 

idea of personal glory for himself or his 
regiment. He ordered that the 2nd 
Battalion swing to the north and drive 
out the Reds who were holding back 
Major Grouch's battalion. From our 
present line we were close enough to the 
mountain passes immediately to our 
west to block them by artillery fire, but 
farther north it was necessary that our 
forces win a more complete victory and 
drive the Reds back much farther in 
order that our line to the north might 
be approximately the same distance from 
the mountain passes as my own troops 
now were. Also, in that direction lay 
Emmitsburg, a great depot of Red 
supplies. So, when the 2nd Battalion 
arrived, I told it to roll up the Reds to 
the north of us, and to proceed more or 
less independently of my men, but that 
I would help if they so desired. The 
major promptly made his dispositions 
and started on his way. Very soon the 
firing in Four Points ceased, and I knew 
that our 2nd Battalion had been suc- 
cessful. In fact, I learned later that it 
had captured many prisoners and cov- 
ered itself with distinction. 

I went forward to hill 463 and looked 
over the situation. It was evident that 
my battalion could not go much farther. 
I gave orders for each company to send 
forward one platoon 1,000 yards and 



134 Booby's Bluffs 

establish an outpost; meanwhile the 
rest of each company was to be reor- 
ganized and to prepare the position for 
defense against counter-attack. My 
losses had been very heavy; some 65 
per cent of my battalion had been killed 
or wounded. All were tired and worn 
with the stress of battle. But each man 
walked proudly, with an air which said 
for itself that the owner of his haughty 
air had been in "The Battle of Booby's 
Bluffs." 



A Book List 



United States 
Infantry & 
Association 



American Rifle $6.00 

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Special regulations No. 57 with addi- 
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Elements of Military Hygiene $2.50 

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Infantry Drill Regulations (Provisional) .60 

Our own edition annotated and fully 
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Map Reading .60 

Explanatory text complete in every 
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cover. 

Mass Physical Training $5.00 

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The basis for the training and instruc- 
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United States in physical training. 
Chapters on the tactics of baseball, 
football and basket-ball profusely 
illustrated. 



Military Sketching and Map Reading $1.50 
— Grieves 
A complete revision and enlargement 
of the work that has long been the 
standard instruction book in the 
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of scales prescribed by the War De- 
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map reproduction. 

Military Signaling .60 

A complete pocket manual of military 
signaling. Prescribed arm signals ex- 
plained and fully illustrated. Sema- 
phore, wig-wag and cipher codes; 
heliograph and projector signaling. 

Minor Tactics $1.25 

A reprint of the map problems pre- 
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weapons with which the Infantry sol- 
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Scouting and Patrolling .75 

— Waldron 
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how a scout goes about his work as an 
individual and how the operations for 
patrol are conducted. 

Soldiers' Handbook $1.25 

Manual of Military Training based on 
official War Department manuals and 
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Tactical Walks $1.50 

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The discussions, explanations and so- 
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minor details. 



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The only text book on this important 
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Reserve Officers' Examiner $2.00 

A complete set of questions and an- 
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the five subjects included in the basic 
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Forty Days in 1914 $2.00 

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The fearless speaker whose caustic 
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History of the A. E. F. $6.00 

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An outline History of the Combat Di- 
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Our Military History, Its Facts and Fal- 
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Another story telling how Germany 
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Principles of War $4.00 

— General Ferdinand Foch 

Lectures delivered while at the Ecole 
de Guerre. 

General Staff and Its Problems, 

2 vols. $15.00 

— Gen. Von Ludendorff 
The latest contribution by this author. 






The Battle of 
Booby's Bluffs 

By 

Major Single List 



The Defense of Duffers Drift, by Gen- 
eral Swinton, has long been a classic, illus- 
trating the principles of minor tactics. It 
was first published in the United States by 
the Infantry Journal. 

The World War introduced new weapons 
and new means of offense and defense. 
This book follows the general plan of its 
prototype, but applies the changed princi- 
ples incident to the later methods. 

Price 75 cents 



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